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Water and Taxes
Dave Owen*
This article considers how water consumption in the United States is
and should be taxed. It reviews the few federal and state tax code
provisions that directly target water use and the somewhat larger number
of provisions with indirect implications for water policy. It also draws
upon existing literature on tax policy, water law, and water economics to
evaluate whether taxation of water consumption makes sense.
That analysis leads to two key conclusions. First, although provisions of
tax law affect water use, and although some provisions undercut key
policy goals of water law, they do so only to a modest extent. The
intersections between the two fields are limited and largely inadvertent.
Second, the interconnections between the fields should be stronger; water
use should be taxed. The reasons are similar to commonly-cited
justifications for carbon taxes and other so-called Pigouvian taxes:
taxation would encourage more efficient water consumption, decreasing
the negative environmental and energy consequences of water overuse and
alleviating conflict among competing users. Taxation also would raise
revenue, which could fund badly-needed water infrastructure and
governance or reduce the need to tax more socially desirable activities.
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INTRODUCTION
The past few decades have brought drought after drought to the
American West. The region has always been dry - "a semi-desert
with a desert heart," - but recent droughts have set records.'
According to climate models, the future threatens to bring even more
extreme weather, and with it, more intense competition for water.2
And the American West is not unique.3 Around the world, water is
becoming increasingly precious.4
Yet in much of the American West, and the rest of the world, people
consume water in puzzling ways.5 The highest economic returns from
water consumption typically come from urban and industrial use.6 But
most water goes to agriculture, and many agricultural users still grow
relatively low-value crops, often in inefficient ways.7 Even in urban
areas, huge quantities of water go to questionable uses; much of the
United States' water irrigates non-native ornamental plants and lawns
I See WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS 60
(1992). Stegner attributes the phrase to historian Walter Prescott Webb, and the quote
is widely credited to Webb's article. See Walter Prescott Webb, The American West,
Perpetual Mirage, HARPERS, May 1, 1957. But the phrase does not actually appear in
that article, though Webb's central thesis is indeed that the West has a desert heart.
On the severity of California's current drought, see Michael E. Mann & Peter H.
Gleick, Climate Change and California Drought in the 21st Century, 112 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. Sci. 3858, 3858 (2015).
2 See Gregg Garfin et al., Southwest, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT 463 (.M. Melillo et al. eds.,
2014) ("Severe and sustained drought will stress water sources, already over-utilized
in many areas, forcing increasing competition among farmers, energy producers,
urban dwellers, and plant and animal life for the region's most precious resource.").
3 See Jacob Schewe et al., Multimodal Assessment of Water Scarcity Under Climate
Change, 111 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCL 3245 (2014); C. ADAM SCHLOSSER ET AL., THE
FUTURE OF GLOBAL WATER STRESS: AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT 1 (2014),
http://globalchange.mit.edufiles/documen/MITJPSPGCRpt254.pdf.
4 See Schewe et al., supra note 3. For a very partial sampling of the many
warnings of water crises, see generally BRAHMA CHELLANEY, WATER, PEACE, AND WAR:
CONFRONTING THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2013); ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE:
AMERICA'S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2009); SANDRA POSTEL, LAST OASIS:
FACING WATER SCARCITY (1992); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST
AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1993).
5 See Eduardo Porter, The Risks of Cheap Water, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2014, at BI.
6 See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEx. L.
REv. 1873, 1887-88 (2005) (discussing value disparities).
7 See Irrigation Water Use, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://water.usgs.gov/edu/
wuir.html (last updated Oct. 27, 2016) ("Estimates vary, but about 70 percent of all
the world's freshwater withdrawals go towards irrigation uses.").
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or just goes to waste.8 Water use in many parts of the world is also
unsustainable. One recent study predicted that by 2050, three billion
people could live in areas where surface water demand exceeds
supply.9 And aggressive water use is environmentally destructive.
Aquatic ecosystems depend on flow, and when those flows are
pumped away, biological diversity and other measures of water quality
almost inevitably suffer.10
Addressing these challenges has become the central focus of the
field of water law. And the field has responded in many ways, some
partially successful. Environmental laws have constrained some of the
most environmentally destructive water use practices." Urban and
agricultural water use efficiency has improved, and for decades, the
United States has grown its economy and population without
increasing aggregate water withdrawals.12 Water transfers also have
shifted some water use from low value crops to other higher-value
uses.1 3 But even with all these changes, water shortages and water
conflict persist.
So what else might be done? This Article proposes what initially
might seem like an odd solution. Water lawyers hardly ever discuss
the possibility of using taxation to influence water allocation,'4 and in
8 See Sarah B. Schindler, Banning Lawns, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 394, 395-96
(2014); Outdoor Water Use in the United States, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www3.epa.gov/watersense/pubs/outdoor.html (last updated Nov. 30, 2016)
("Nationwide, landscape irrigation is estimated to account for nearly one-third of all
residential water use .... [S]ome experts estimate that as much as 50 percent of water
used for irrigation is wasted.").
9 See SCHLOSSER ET AL., supra note 3, at 24.
10 See Stuart E. Bunn & Angela H. Arthington, Basic Principles and Ecological
Consequences of Altered Flow Regimes for Aquatic Biodiversity, 30 ENVTL. MGMT. 492,
492-93 (2002).
11 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and
Fall of CALFED, 37 ENVTL. L. 1145, 1183-89 (2007) [hereinafter Environmental
Dynamism] (describing federal and state environmental laws and their influence in
California).
12 See WILLIAM B. DEOREO ET AL., RESIDENTIAL END USES OF WATER, VERSION 2,
EXECUTIVE REPORT 3 (2016); Peter Gleick, Peak Water: United States Water Use Drops to
Lowest Level in 40 Years, Sci. BLOGS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://scienceblogs.com/
significantfigures/index.php/2014/11/05/peak-water-united-states-water-use-drops-to-
lowest-level-in-40-years/.
13 See HEATHER COOLEY ET AL., IMPACTS OF CALIFORNIA'S ONGOING DROUGHT:
AGRICULTURE 12-16 (2015); W. GOVERNORS' AsS'N & W. STATES WATER COUNCIL,
WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST 11 (2012).
14 For rare legal-academic papers on water use and taxation, see generally Lonnie
R. Beard, Survey of the Law and Selected Issues Relating to the Deductibility of Soil and
Water Conservation Expenditures under Section 175 of the Internal Revenue Code, 73 Ky.
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political realms, almost any new tax proposal is toxic. But that has not
stopped carbon taxes from becoming the darlings of regulatory
theory.15 The growing focus upon carbon taxes - and upon
regulatory taxes more generally - stems from simple economics.
Every tax creates collateral incentives, and ideally those incentives
would maximize socially beneficial behavior and minimize harm.16
Indeed, following the theories of Arthur Pigou,1 7 many economists and
legal scholars have argued that taxes set at a level sufficient to offset
negative externalities should be the preferred legal instrument for
L.J. 723 (1985); C. Marvin Brewer, Taxation of Water Rights in California, 53 J. AM.
WATER WORKS AsS'N 619 (1961); James A. Fellows, The Taxation of Water Rights, 30
REAL EST. L.J. 333 (2002); Stanford D. Herlick, Water Rights Taxation, 3 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 153 (1963); Thomas Lee, The Water Excise Tax: Preserving a Necessary
Resource, 4 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 171 (2009); John H. Messing, Recent Development:
Cost Depletion of Groundwater, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1229 (1966); Raphael J. Moses & M.
Wray Witten, Taxation of Water Rights, 25 S.D. L. REv. 475 (1980); Tom Kuhnle, Note,
The Federal Income Tax Implications of Water Transfers, 47 STAN. L. REv. 533 (1995).
This article adds to previous work in two key ways. First, with one exception, none
of these articles considers taxation as a mode of regulation, and many focus narrowly
on a particular provision of tax law. Lee's article does consider the possibility of a
Pigouvian tax, see Lee, supra, at 184-89, but my article offers a broader and deeper
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of such taxation, as well as a survey of
the existing intersections between water law and tax law.
A much larger body of economic literature considers how water users respond to
price signals, and some of that literature mentions taxes as a potential mechanism for
pricing. However, much of that literature focuses on other pricing instruments, like
use fees, and the literature that does focus on taxation generally assumes the existence
of both taxation and economically rational responses to that taxation. See, e.g., Maria
Berrittella et al., The Economic Impact of Restricted Water Supply: A Computable General
Equilibrium Analysis, 41 WATER RES. 1799 (2007); Nicholas Kilimani et al., Water
Taxation and the Double Dividend Hypothesis, 10 WATER RESOURCES & EcoN. 68 (2015);
Anthony Letsoalo et al., Triple Dividends of Water Consumption Charges in South Africa,
43 WATER RESOURCES RES. W05412 (2007); Changbo Qin et al., The Economic Impact
of Water Tax Charges in China A Static Computable General Equilibrium Analysis, 37
WATER INT'L 279 (2012). For a rare example of a paper that considers the messy
institutional complexities of water taxation, see Marianne Schuerhoff et al., The Life
and Death of the Dutch Groundwater Tax, 15 WATER POL'Y 1064 (2013).
15 See, e.g., SHI-LING Hsu, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-
UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward
a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 96 (2015) (noting the esteemed membership
of the "Pigou Club" supportive of carbon taxes).
16 See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 120 (4th ed. 2008) (noting that tax-related incentives are
pervasive).
17 See Janet E. Milne & Mikael Skou Andersen, Introduction to Environmental
Taxation Concepts and Research, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL
TAXATION 15-17 (Janet E. Milne & Mikael Skou Andersen eds., 2012) (discussing
Pigou's ideas).
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addressing environmental and other social harms.1 8 A carbon tax
presents a classic opportunity for such incentive-based regulation:
governments might reduce climate change while simultaneously
generating revenues, and those revenues could reduce the need to tax
income (and thus labor) or some other socially desirable activity.' 9
This Article asks whether similar arguments apply to water.
More specifically, it addresses two questions. The first major
question is how, if at all, existing tax law in the United States affects
water use. Federal, state, and local tax codes contain few provisions
directly targeted at water use, but that does not preclude indirect
effects. And, indeed, provisions with such indirect effects are sprinkled
throughout the field of tax law. 20 From excise tax exemptions that
encourage irrigation 21 to federal policies that treat water efficiency
rebates as taxable income22 to production incentives for water bottling
companies,23 federal and state codes contain a wide variety of minor
collisions between water policy and tax law. None of the resulting
incentives seem powerful enough to create major changes in water use
patterns, but some do offer promising targets for modest reform.
This Article's second major question is broader: how should tax law
address water use? To put it slightly differently, does the field of water
law offer another promising opportunity for Pigouvian taxation, or at
least something like it? Here, the answer is a qualified yes. Water use
is sensitive to economic incentives.24 And those economic incentives
could help improve allocation patterns.25 Water taxes also could
Is E.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 15 ("Other forms of regulation are inferior to
the Pigouvian tax."). Not everyone is so sure. See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note
16, at 169 ("Just about every time someone comes up with a bright idea about how the
government should encourage one activity or discourage another, the tax system gets
the call."); Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1673, 1691-92 (2015) (arguing that Pigouvian taxes are a good fit for greenhouse gas
regulation and not much else).
19 See N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to join the Pigou Club,
35 E. EcON. J. 14, 16 (2009).
20 See infra Part I.
21 See 26 U.S.C. § 40 (2012) (granting an excise tax exemption for the production
of ethanol, which incentivizes irrigation for corn growth); infra notes 156-63 and
accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
23 See 26 U.S.C. § 199(c)(4)(A)(i)(III) (2012); infra notes 112-15 and
accompanying text.
24 See Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, Comparing Price and Nonprice
Approaches to Urban Water Conservation, 45 WATER RESOURCES RES., W04301 (2009),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2008WROO7227/epdf.
25 See Glennon, supra note 6, at 1883-88. While Glennon advocates pricing as a
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provide a new source of revenue, which could help pay for better
water infrastructure or governance, provide direct rebates to the
public, or reduce the need for other forms of taxation.26 And while
water taxation may initially strike people as strange or misguided,
there is no compelling argument that explains why water is an
inappropriate or unjust focus for taxation.27
This Article's analysis proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the
current tax status of consumptive water use28 in the United States. 29 It
explores the few direct and somewhat more numerous indirect ways in
which tax policy is likely to affect water use, and the incentives those
interactions create. Part 1I then provides a qualified argument for
water use taxation. It considers the basic justifications for water
taxation, as well as important caveats to those justifications, and
concludes that water use is an appropriate, though not exactly easy,
target for taxation.
Of course, because this paper is about tax policy, there is an
elephant in the room. All taxes are unpopular, and the academic
enthusiasm for Pigouvian taxes has not translated - so far - into
widespread political support for the concept, at least within the United
States.30 Even in other countries, where a few environmental taxes
have been adopted, their sponsors have suffered a political toll.3 1 For
mechanism for water allocation reform, he recommends raising service costs for
municipal users and allowing water transfers, not imposing taxes on water rights or
water use.
26 See infra notes 280-94 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 298-326 and accompanying text.
28 Because my focus is consumptive use, this article is not about the tax status of
waterfront property. The article also does not deal in any great depth with the reality
that some water uses, like hydropower generation, consume very little of the water
they use. The architects of any system of water use taxation would need to address
that reality, perhaps by taxing net use of water rather than withdrawals, or perhaps by
taxing largely non-consumptive uses at much lower rates. But the details of those
systems are a subject for another paper.
29 Much of this paper focuses on the western United States, where water law is
generally more developed, water shortages are more acute, and the academic literature
on water use is more extensive. But its arguments should apply to any jurisdiction
concerned about water consumption levels.
30 See Mankiw, supra note 19, at 35-36 ("As judged on purely political terms,
higher Pigouvian taxes are a wacky idea.").
31 See, e.g., Mark Jaccard, The Political Acceptability of Carbon Taxes: Lessons from
British Columbia, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, supra note
17, at 175-76, 187 (observing that British Columbia's carbon tax hurt the popularity of
the party that sponsored it - but also that the tax survived, and that political attacks
have diminished); Julia Baird, A Carbon Tax's Ignoble End: Why Tony Abbott Axed
Australia's Carbon Tax, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2014, at A27.
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those reasons, a few words about this analysis's degree of political
naivete are appropriate. In short, I do not analyze the political
economy of water taxes. My goal, instead, is to introduce and support
a policy idea that has merit, and thus, perhaps, to extend slightly the
realm of political possibility.
I. THE CURIOUS TAX STATUS OF WATER USE
The fields of water and tax law do not normally mix. Ask a water
lawyer how water rights are taxed, and the answer, most likely, will
be, "they're not."3 2 Ask a tax lawyer about water law and the
conversation will probably come to a quick end. There are some
reasons for that mutual lack of awareness. In the United States, water
taxes are generally an unfamiliar concept. In some other countries,
interest in water taxes is slightly higher,33 but the law of water taxation
is still notable primarily for its absence.
That mutual lack of awareness has many consequences, one of
which is that few people are familiar with both realms. For that
reason, this part begins with a brief summary of each field before
turning to discussion of their intersections. Readers should be aware
that both water and tax law are exceedingly complex, and what
follows is just an introductory overview.
A. Water Law 101
For many years, the primary goal of water law in the United States
was to divvy surface water up among competing private claimants.3 4
Their claims generally arose under two primary systems of water
rights. In the eastern United States, riparian water rights, which
entitled waterfront landowners to make reasonable use of waterways,
offered the primary system for allocating rights in surface water.35 In
the Rocky Mountain states, the doctrine of prior appropriation
displaced riparian rights.36 In the high plains and west coast states, the
32 A particularly savvy water lawyer will say something like, "their value is factored
into tax appraisals of land." See generally Moses & Witten, supra note 14, at 475.
33 See, e.g., Schuerhoff et al., supra note 14 (discussing the implementation of "a
Dutch groundwater tax implemented in 1995").
34 See Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV.
717, 720-21 (2007).
35 See BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 28
(5th ed. 2013).
36 See Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317, 322
(Nev. 1889) (excising riparian rights from Nevada law); see also Coffin v. Left Hand
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two doctrines maintain an uneasy coexistence.37 In a prior
appropriation system, rights exist on a first-come, first-served basis,
and the earliest, or most "senior," user can take his full share before a
junior user takes any of his.38 Unlike riparian rights, an appropriative
right can be tied to any parcel of land, not just parcels adjacent to the
waterway.39
Despite their profound differences, there are also some underlying
similarities between riparian and appropriative rights. First, both
systems involve property rights.40 Those rights may be highly
qualified, and the state, acting as trustee for its people, typically
maintains its own interests in and regulatory authority over
waterways.41 But the field of water law nevertheless has one foot firmly
planted in property law. Second, both kinds of rights are increasingly
administered through permitting systems and by administrative
agencies. 42 Thus, water law's other foot is firmly planted in
administrative law. Balancing atop that dual foundation is often
difficult.43
In many states, rights to groundwater are just as important as rights
to surface water.44 A surprisingly large percentage of water use in the
United States (and in many other parts of the world) depends on
underground sources, and in many agricultural and rural regions,
groundwater is the primary or even the exclusive source of water
supply.45 At one time, groundwater use was very lightly regulated,
partly on the theory that groundwater flow was too incomprehensible
to allow any meaningful legal intervention. 46 That view has changed,
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) (doing the same for Colorado).
37 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law Burdens of Modern
Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 485, 486-87 (1986) (critiquing the case that retained
riparian rights in California).
38 See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 171.
39 See id. at 170.
40 See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law,
61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257, 260 (1990) ("Water rights are property." (emphasis added)).
41 See Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 1, 4, 26-27 (2002).
42 See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 132-33, 172-73 (describing movements
toward permitting in both riparian and prior appropriation systems).
43 See Fischman, supra note 34, at 718-19 (noting that natural resources law
generally sits atop this dual foundation).
44 See Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 254-55 (2013)
[hereinafter Taking Groundwater] (explaining the importance of groundwater).
45 See id.
46 See Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am.
Aggregates Corp., 15 Ohio St. 3d 384, 387 (1984) ("Because the existence, origin,
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at least somewhat, and most states now have legal doctrines defining
the boundaries of property rights in groundwater, as well as some
degree of administrative agency involvement in administering those
rights.47
While these rights hold fundamental importance to the water law
field, most water users do not actually hold water rights. Instead, most
people obtain water through contracts with cities, water districts,
mutual water companies, or other types of suppliers.48 Many suppliers
obtain their water through contracts with other suppliers, so
sometimes the end user of water is several contracts removed from the
holder of the underlying right.49 There are thousands of these
intermediary suppliers, and they come in a wide variety of legal
forms.5 0 Some are governmental, some are private, and some blur the
boundaries between those spheres.51
In carrying out their work, these suppliers are bound not just by
property doctrines and contractual terms, but also by a massive
superstructure of federal and state regulatory law. Some of that
regulation exists purely for the purpose of managing conflicts among
competing water consumers.52 But much of it exists to ensure
environmental protection of aquatic resources.53 That environmental
purpose implicates another fundamental tension of modern water
politics and law. Much of American water law - particularly in the
movement and course of such waters . . . are so secret, occult, and concealed . . . an
attempt to administer any sort of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in
hopeless uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible."). Nineteenth-
century commitments to laissez-faire political ideologies also slowed the development
of groundwater use regulation. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 105 (1977).
4 See Owen, Taking Groundwater, supra note 44, at 268-69.
48 See Public-Supply Water Use, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://water.usgs.gov/edu/
wups.html (last visited July 6, 2016) (showing data on sources of water supply). This
is less likely to be true in rural areas, where many people rely on their own
groundwater wells. See Owen, Taking Groundwater, supra note 44, at 254-55.
49 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 687 (1993) [hereinafter Institutional Perspectives].
5o See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 766-74.
51 In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court held that one person/one
vote principles do not apply to water districts, which instead can allocate voting rights
on the basis of landownership. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371-72 (1981); Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 733-74 (1973).
Consequently, a water district can be dominated by a relatively small number of
landowners even if it serves a relatively large population.
52 See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1375 (2016) (allowing new appropriations only if
unappropriated water is available, and thus protecting existing appropriators).
53 See Owen, Environmental Dynamism, supra note 11, at 1182-89.
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West - evolved in an era when water that flowed to the ocean was
viewed as water wasted, and when the United States Supreme Court
might reprove great western rivers for "thriftlessly dissipat[ing] their
waters in the Pacific tides."54 Consequently, many water users -
particularly farmers, who were among the first users on the scene,55
and who often benefited from major federal infrastructure projects -
appropriated enormous quantities of water, leaving scant flows in
rivers and little new water for later-growing.cities or towns. 56 With the
advent of the environmental movement, and with the increasing
urbanization of the nation, values and demands have shifted, often
dramatically - but not everywhere.57 The tension between the new
users and the old now drives much of the work of water lawyers.
One other feature of American water law also bears mention,
particularly in a paper about taxes. In the United States (and elsewhere
in the world), water is generally subsidized, if not free.58 That may
sound surprising, for most people pay a water bill every month. But
that water bill generally covers the cost - or, often, just part of the
cost - of building, maintaining, and operating the infrastructure
necessary to store, move, and treat water.59 Unless we buy it in a
plastic bottle, we generally pay nothing for water itself.60
54 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 728 (1950).
55 To put the point a bit more precisely, western farmers were among the first
white users on the scene. Native Americans had also been using water for centuries,
and tensions between the old white uses and the very old Native American uses are
also an important part of western water law. See, e.g., GEOFFREY O'GARA, WHAT YOU
SEE IN CLEAR WATER: LIFE ON THE WIND RIVER RESERVATION (2000) (chronicling the
long history of water conflict between Native Americans and white irrigators in
Wyoming's Wind River basin).
56 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 42
(1996) [hereinafter Common Wealth] (arguing that traditional water law generated
allocation patterns that have become harmful and obsolete).
57 For a sweeping history of these changes in California, see generally NORRIS
HUNDLEYJR., THE GREAT THIRST (rev. ed. 2001).
58 See Michael Hanemann, The Economic Conception of Water, in WATER CRISIS:
MYTH OR REALITY 61, 74-76 (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 2006).
59 See id.; Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 24, at 1 ("Urban water prices lie well
below [long-run marginal cost] in many countries.").
60 To put the point more specifically, the price does not factor in the scarcity value
of water. Hanemann, supra note 58, at 76. The exception to this principle is that
purchasers of property with water rights will generally pay the seller for the value of
those rights. See Ellen Hanak et al., Myths of California Water: Implications and Reality,
16 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 3, 21 (2010). But neither the purchaser nor
the seller will ever have paid the public for the ability to pump water.
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B. Tax Law 101
Every year, the United States federal government collects well over a
trillion dollars in taxes.61 State and local governments collect over a
trillion dollars more.62 These taxes fund the lion's share of governmental
activity in the United States, and thus play a constitutive role in creating
our nation and defining our politics. 63 The law of taxation is just as
complicated as one might expect from the scale of the enterprise. At the
federal level, the Internal Revenue Code defines tax law, along with the
IRS's many implementing regulations, guidance documents, advice
letters, and other formal and informal modes of communicating tax law
principles and rules.64 Each state has its own tax code, and taxation is
also a key part of local government law. 65
The United States' most important tax is the federal income tax,
which applies to both individuals and corporations. 66 Within the
income tax system, the federal government gives preferential rates to
capital gains on investments. 67 The estate tax also gives the federal
government a share of particularly large bequests. 68 As politicians
frequently remind us, federal tax requirements are generally riddled
with exemptions and deductions, all designed, in theory, to create a
fairer and more economically sensible tax system.69 The collateral
effect of those exemptions, however, is to create a tax system widely
reviled for its complexity.70
State taxes are in some ways similar to the federal system and in
some ways quite different. Most states also have income taxes, though
61 For statistics, see Amount of Revenue by Source, TAX POL'Y CTR. (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/amount-revenue-source.
62 See Quarterly Summary of State and Local Tax Revenue, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/govs/qtax/ (last visited July 6, 2016).
63 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 16, at 2 ("[Taxation] is the aspect of
government that directly affects more people than any other.").
64 See Tax Code, Regulations, and Official Guidance, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/tax-
pro fessionals/tax-code-regulations-and-official-guidance (last visited July 11, 2016).
65 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 15-16 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing state and local taxes).
66 See TAX POL'Y CTR., supra note 61 (showing amounts collected).
67 See Ten Important Facts about Capital Gains and Losses, IRS (Feb. 18, 2011),
https://www.irs.gov/uac/ten-important-facts-about-capital-gains-and-losses.
68 See Estate Tax, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/estate-tax (last updated Oct. 28, 2016) (stating thresholds for estate tax
requirements); SLEMROD & BAKl)A, supra note 16, at 14 (showing sources of federal
revenue).
69 See SLEMROD & BAKlJA, supra note 16, at 165.
70 See id. at 3, 4 ("The cost of such complexity is staggering.").
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state tax rates are lower than the federal rates for comparable income
brackets.7 ' Most states also use sales taxes as a significant revenue
source. 72 Local governments in most states tax real property, and those
property taxes provide a key revenue source for education and other
local government functions. 73 Like federal taxes, state taxes are often
subject to multiple exemptions. And unlike federal taxes, which
Congress holds relatively unfettered power to enact, many states have
constitutional limitations on their governments' ability to raise old
taxes or to impose new ones.74
At the most general level, the reasons for all of this taxation are
uncontroversial. As James Madison once put it, "[tihe power of taxing
people and their property is essential to the very existence of
government," and most people would readily agree that the unpleasant
alternative to government is a Hobbesian state of nature.75 But
agreement on that general principle does not resolve the more thorny
questions about how much taxation should occur, what should be
taxed, and from whom those taxes should be collected. Those
questions capture the basic policy debates of tax law, and there are a
variety of ways of coming to answers. One approach frames tax issues
as questions of justice and fairness.76 So, for example, a person might
argue that taxation is wrong because it is essentially a confiscation of
property,77 or that it is right because paying taxes fulfills a social
contract shared among members of society.78 Another approach to tax
questions focuses on economic utility and administrability. 79 For that
71 See Jared Walczak, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2015, Tax
Found. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-individual-income-tax-
rates-and-brackets-2015.
72 See Scott Drenkard & Nicole Kaeding, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2016,
TAX FOUND. (Mar. 9, 2016), http://taxfoundation.orglarticle/state-and-local-sales-tax-
rates-2016.
73 See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) (explaining connections between
property taxation, local zoning, education, and inequality).
74 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (limiting overall property tax rates and the rate
at which tax assessments for individual properties can increase).
75 Tax Quotes, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/tax-quotes (last visited June 1, 2016).
76 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 16, at 57-98.
77 E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 283-305 (1985).
78 For arguments grounded in justice and the constitutive role of taxation in
creating an economy and society, see, for example, LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL,
THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002).
79 E.g., Roland Benabou, Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social
Contract, 90 AM. EcoN. REV. 96, 97 (2000); see SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 16, at
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latter framing, the key questions are whether a tax will create
incentives that maximize aggregate wealth and whether that tax
actually can be collected in an efficient and consistent way.80
C. Where Water and Taxes Meet
So how do those two systems intersect? The most striking feature of
tax law's treatment of water rights is how little treatment there actually
is. The phrase "water right" does not appear in the United States
Internal Revenue Code. It is similarly absent from the tax codes of
many states,81 and those states that do discuss water consumption in
their tax codes generally do so briefly.82 On a few occasions, state
legislators have proposed more comprehensive taxation schemes for
water rights, but they have not been enacted. 3 Nevertheless,
intersections do exist, and the paragraphs that follow survey key ways
in which federal and state tax laws in the United States affect water
policy.84
1. Water and Property Taxes
The most significant area of overlap between water law and tax law
is property rights taxation.85 Real property is taxed in every state, and
99-188.
8 See Benabou, supra note 79, at 97.
81 It also is largely absent from state constitutions, though Utah does have a
constitutional provision expressly exempting water rights from property taxation. See
UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
82 As one might expect, western states are more likely to have tax provisions tied
to water use. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 43-1090.01 (2014), repealed by Laws 2014,
Ch. 245, § 21 (allowing tax credits for the installation of water conservation systems);
COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-533 (2017) (allowing a tax credit for donations of
water rights to instream flow).
83 See, e.g., California Water Resources Investment Act of 2011, S.B. 34, 2011-
2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill
id=201120120SB34 (containing text of a never-enacted bill that would have required
all water suppliers to include volume- or acreage-based water charges). For narrower,
and also-unsuccessful, efforts, see, for example, Scott Thistle, Tax for Bottled Water
Companies Faces Struggle in Maine Legislature, LEWISTON SUN-J., Mar. 11, 2015.
In the 1960s, California considered a constitutional amendment that would have
banned water taxation, but that, too, was not adopted. See Brewer, supra note 14, at 622.
84 My selection of tax provisions comes with a caveat: these are tax code
provisions with particularly strong relationships to water use. In one sense, every tax
code provision that affects the overall level of economic activity also affects water use.
But for purposes of maintaining some focus, this Part does not address every causal
relationship, no matter how attenuated, between tax code provisions and water use.
85 See Moses & Witten, supra note 14, at 476.
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in many parts of the country, access to water is a significant factor in
the valuation of land.86 In the West, for example, a parcel of
agricultural land with associated senior water rights should be much
more valuable than an otherwise similar parcel with junior rights.87
Similarly, a residential or commercial developer is likely to place less
value on a parcel of land that lacks access to municipal water
supplies.88 For that reason, it is not actually accurate to say, as my
hypothetical water lawyer did, that water rights and water access are
not taxed. They are, and in some areas, most property taxation is
really water taxation.89
But the use of taxes on land as a vehicle for indirect taxation of
water has several intriguing implications. First, and most importantly,
property taxes focus on access to water, not actual use of water.90 Two
suburban parcels with equivalent water access are likely to be treated
exactly the same (assuming all other things are equal), even if one
owner's sprinklers routinely douse his lawns and gardens while his
neighbor's xeriscaped garden requires hardly any water at all. 91
Similarly, two similar agricultural parcels with otherwise equivalent
water rights will pay the same amount of taxes even if one owner
actually uses half as much water to irrigate her crops. Indeed, if that
second owner sells some of the conserved water, and thus turns it into
a secondary income stream, she actually will pay more taxes, because
86 See Allan Jenkins et al., Water Rights and Land Values in the West-Central Plains,
17 GREAT PLAINS RES. 101, 109-10 (2007) (finding a significant contribution from
water rights to land values, and summarizing other studies reaching similar
conclusions).
87 See DANIEL BRENT, THE VALUE OF HETEROGENEOUS WATER RIGHTS: THE COSTS OF
WATER VOLATILITY (2013), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/149698/2/Brent-
WaterRights_.AAEA.pdf (finding that farmers in Washington's Yakima Valley will pay
nine to twelve percent more for properties with senior water rights).
88 While my focus here is water consumption, recreational and visual water access
also are important factors in valuations of land. See Andy Krause, What Is Waterfront
Worth?, ZILLOW (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.zillow.comL/research/what-is-waterfront-
worth-7540/ ("Nationally, waterfront homes are worth more than double of the value
of homes overall.").
89 See City & Cty. of S.F. v. Alameda County, 54 P.2d 462, 464 (Cal. 1936) ("In
some cases the value of the land severed from the water right might well be negligible
for taxing purposes.").
90 See Moses & Witten, supra note 14, at 481-84 (describing older cases that
upheld tax assessments that incorporated the value of unexercised water rights).
91 Xeriscaping means landscaping with plants that require relatively little water.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER-SMART LANDSCAPES 4 (2013).
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her water right now will generate more income as well as lending
value to her property.92
A second implication is that exemptions from property rights
taxation also become exemptions from water taxation. In the United
States, thousands of entities do not pay property taxes.93 Some of those
entities - like college campuses and public golf courses - use large
quantities of water to keep their grass green, but they escape even
indirect taxes on the value their properties receive from water
consumption. 94 Other entities, though not fully exempt, have reduced
liability. For example, some states provide property tax incentives
designed to keep land in agricultural use.95 To the extent those
incentives lower property tax assessments below market rates, they
also provide indirect tax breaks for water access.
Third, and relatedly, using property taxation as a vehicle for water
taxation has important implications for the overall rates of water taxes.
Many states have constitutional limits on the rates at which property
taxes may change. 96 California is a prominent example; taxes on all
forms of property - including agricultural property - may rise by
only two percent each year, even if the market value of that property
has increased to a much greater extent, and only when the property is
sold may assessments reset.97 The net result is an enormous shift in
tax burdens from longtime property owners to recent purchasers, and
owners of agricultural land with established water rights benefit just as
92 See Kuhnle, supra note 14, at 543-44. She will also make more money, so
paying additional taxes may not seem so bad.
93 See, e.g., N.Y. ST. DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN., ASSESSOR'S MANUAL, EXEMPTION
ADMINISTRATION: SUBJECT INDEX § 2.01, httpsi/www.tax.ny.gov/research/property/
assess/manuals/vol4/ptl/section2/sec2_01.htm (last updated Jan. 15, 2015) (providing a
long list of exemptions from property taxation); Exemptions, CAL. ST. BD. EQUALIZATION,
https://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/exempt.htm (last visited July 11, 2016).
94 See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Testa, 38 N.E.3d 847, 847 (Ohio 2015) (upholding
property tax exemptions for a public golf course that was managed by a private
entity).
95 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-201 (2016) (stating that all agricultural land shall
be valued, for property tax purposes, at seventy-five percent of market value); The
Land Conservation Act, CAL. DEPT. CONSERVATION, http://www.conservation.ca.gov/
dlrp/lca (last visited July 11, 2016) (describing California's Williamson Act, which
gives preferential tax treatment to agricultural and open space lands).
96 See Benjamin H. Harris & Brian David Moore, Residential Property Taxes in the
United States, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL'Y CTR. 1 (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.
brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2013/11/18-residential-property-taxes/18-
residential-property-taxes-harris.pdf ("Virtually all states have statutes limiting the
scope of the property tax . . . .").
97 See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1992) (describing Proposition 13).
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much from that shift as longtime homeowners.98 Even in many places
that lack California's formal restraints, a combination of tradition,
politics, and tax assessors' discretion keeps property tax assessments
well below market values, and those lowered assessments also reduce
whatever portion of a property tax bill would be attributable to water
access or rights.99 A variety of mechanisms designed to keep property
taxes low thus benefits water users.
Taxing water by taxing land also means a hidden but important
institutional choice. Assessments of the value of water access and
water rights are generally done by tax assessors, who are trained
primarily to value land. Yet in some circumstances, the valuation of
water rights will raise highly complex questions, many of which would
challenge even an experienced water lawyer. How should the relative
seniority of different rights be valued?100 How should uncertainties
associated with potential future environmental restrictions, or with
climate change, affect the valuation of the land to which water rights
attach?' 01 These are thorny issues, but existing guidance on water
rights valuation gives them only cursory treatment.1 02
There are also advantages to folding water rights taxation into the
taxation of real property. Most importantly, it avoids - sometimes -
the necessity of placing separate values on land and water rights, when
in reality the value of each is often intertwined.t 0 3 A separate system of
water rights taxation also could create its own issues with exempt
98 See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (referring to all "real property").
99 See Jay Romano, Market vs. Appraisal: What's the Real Value?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/08/realestate/your-home-market-vs-appraisal-
what-s-the-real-value.html (noting common disparities between market and assessed
value).
100 See BRENT, supra note 87 (estimating the value of seniority).
101 For example, water deliveries by California's major federal and state water projects
have fluctuated drastically in recent years, partly in response to environmental restrictions
but primarily in response to warmer and dryer weather. See Jim Carlton, California Cuts
Water Delivery in Drought, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 31, 2014, 6:52 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303743604579355241804705208; Paul
Rogers, California Drought: Feds Say Farmers Won't Get Any Central Valley Project Water
This Year, SAN JOSE MERCURY-NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.mercurynews.
com/2014/02/21/california-drought-feds-say-farmers-wont-get-any-central-valley-project-
water-this-year/.
102 See, e.g., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUALIZATION, AsSESSORS' HANDBOOK §542, PART 11:
ASSESSMENT OF WATER RIGHTS (2000) (providing very little information about how
water right uncertainties should be valued).
103 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. Separate valuations can become
necessary when water rights are conveyed separately from land. See Gladden v. C.I.R.,
262 F.3d 851, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the cost basis for a water right
could be separated from that of the appurtenant land).
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entities. Many water distributors are governmental entities that might
be exempt from local taxation.104 The United States Bureau of
Reclamation, for example, is the largest holder of water rights in the
American West, but the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution protects it from state or local taxation.105 By taxing the
Bureau of Reclamation's property-owning end users on the value of
their water access, state and local governments do receive some value
from the private benefits that the Bureau of Reclamation provides.
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that taxing water primarily by taxing
land keeps those water taxes low and offers only limited incentives to
conserve.
2. Water and Income Taxation
While property taxes are particularly important to local government,
the most important federal tax is the income tax. And the income tax
system is not completely indifferent to water use. Among the federal
income tax system's many exemptions and deductions, a few
provisions specifically target water, and several other provisions have
indirect consequences for water consumption. Nevertheless, as with
property taxation, those intersections do not reflect any sort of
coordinated plan or policy objective, and some create strange or even
perverse consequences.10 6
a. Water Conservation Deductions
One of the few federal tax code provisions to directly target water
use is Internal Revenue Code section 175, which encourages soil and
water conservation. Specifically, section 175 allows "[a] taxpayer
engaged in the business of farming" to deduct "expenditures ... for
104 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (describing property tax
exemptions).
105 See Cal. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 247 P.3d 112,
127 (Cal. 2011) (noting that the Bureau of Reclamation holds such immunity).
106 The most curious intersection, which I do not address in depth, is a limited
authorization for landowning farmers to treat groundwater drawdown beneath their
land as a business loss. See United States v. Shurbet, 347 F.2d 103, 104 (5th Cir.
1965). The anti-conservation incentive is obvious: the deduction gives a tax advantage
to those who quickly deplete the aquifer beneath their land. The IRS has interpreted
Shurbet as applying only to landowners over the Ogallala Aquifer, a massive - and
famously depleted - aquifer stretching from the Texas Panhandle to Nebraska. See
DEPT. OF REVENUE, IRS, PUBLICATION 225: FARMER'S TAx GUIDE FOR USE IN PREPARING
2015 TAx RETURNS 108 (2015); Groundwater Depletion, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
http://water.usgs.gov/edulgwdepletion.html (last visited July 10, 2016).
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the purpose of soil or water conservation," so long as the work done is
consistent with a governmentally-approved soil or water conservation
plan.107
That may appear to be a direct and powerful incentive to reduce
water use, but things are not always as they seem. Clearly section 175
authorizes income tax deductions for a farmer who - to provide one
possible example - lines earthen irrigation ditches with impermeable
plastic to prevent seepage losses. 108 The section, therefore, provides
incentives for greater efficiency. But in water parlance, the term
"conservation" has had a chameleonic history. In the 1950s, when
Congress first enacted section 175, most western water users believed
conserving water meant storing it behind dams so it could be put to
use, not letting it flow, wasted, through rivers and into the sea.1 09 In
accordance with that perception, farmers could, and at least
sometimes did, claim section 175 deductions for actions that would
actually increase water use, like converting a dryland farm to irrigated
agriculture. 110
Whether present-day section 175 deductions are similarly used is a
difficult question to answer. The IRS does not compile data on specific
uses of section 175 deductions, and that absence of data suggests that
section 175 is not particularly important in practice, at least in the
IRS's view. The Joint Committee on Taxation does publish aggregate
data - section 175 deductions create a total tax expenditure of
approximately 120 million dollars per year - but again does not
break that down into specific uses."' The most one can confidently
conclude is that section 175 might provide modestly consequential
incentives for increased water consumption or for decreased water
consumption - or both.
107 26 U.S.C. § 175(a) (2012). Section 175 also allows deductions for expenses
incurred to implement endangered species recovery plans. See id.
10 Many western irrigators have traditionally used dirt-bottomed ditches to
distribute water. Water then seeps through the bottom of the ditch, and the losses can
be substantial.
109 See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 728 (1950)
(describing the tendency of California's rivers to "thriftlessly dissipate" their "wasting
treasures" into the ocean as a "perversity of nature").
110 See Behring v. C.I.R., 32 T.C. 1256, 1260 (1959) ("The Commissioner concedes
that a farmer who decides to switch from dry farming to wet farming by installing
irrigation facilities can deduct the expenditures under section 175.").
III See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 114TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019, at 31 (Comm. Print 2015).
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b. Water and the Domestic Production Tax Credit
The Internal Revenue Code's other direct reference to water comes
in section 199, a sweeping provision designed to encourage domestic
economic productivity.1 12 In accordance with that purpose, section
199 allows producers of a wide variety of commodities, including,
curiously, "potable water," to deduct a percentage of their receipts on
that commodity from their income taxes. 113
Section 199 provides a clear incentive for increased water use. By
making potable water less expensive to produce, it will either increase
the profits for private firms that deliver water, making the business of
water delivery more enticing to enter, or lower the costs end users pay
for their water, reducing financial impediments to water purchases.114
Nevertheless, that economic signal probably exerts only a minor
influence on aggregate levels of water use. 115 The deduction applies
only to deliveries of potable water by private entities with positive
income balances, and that description only applies to a small
percentage of American water use. The United States' primary water
uses are irrigated agriculture and industrial cooling water, and both
typically use non-potable water.11 6 Among potable water users, the
vast majority receive their water from public entities, and many
private water delivery companies are non-profit entities (and for-profit
entities do not always make profits). 117 For a private and profitable
water company, section 199 can generate significant changes in tax
112 See 26 U.S.C. § 199 (2012). For general discussion of section 199 and its
consequences, see Jennifer Blouin et al., The Effect of the Domestic Production Activities
Deduction on Corporate Payout Behavior, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1092222.
113 26 U.S.C. § 199(c)(4)(A)(i)(1II). The inclusion of potable water is curious
because the overall purpose of section 199 was to encourage domestic production of
commodities traded on global markets, and, with the minor exception of bottled water
sold by a few companies like Perrier, hardly any of the potable water consumed in the
United States comes from foreign sources.
114 For more detailed discussion of consumers' responses to changes in water
pricing, see infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
115 For that reason, section 199 may drive levels of water use more by influencing
overall levels of economic activity than by encouraging the production of potable
water.
116 See Water Use in the United States: Total Water Use, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.
http://water.usgs.gov/watuse/wuto.html (last modified May 2, 2016).
117 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United
States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 785, 791 (2009) (noting that a small (but growing) percentage
of water supply is handled by private companies).
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liability. 118 But from a water policy perspective, the importance of
section 199's coverage of potable water is probably rather modest.
c. Water and Mortgage Interest Deductions
Among the many income tax provisions that indirectly impact water
use, the most important is probably the mortgage interest deduction.
Internal Revenue Code Section 163(h)(3) allows homeowners to
deduct the interest they pay on mortgages.119 As a recent National
Research Council report explains, "because the subsidy lowers the cost
of housing, it makes it easier for families and individuals to own more
or larger houses."1 20 Owning more or larger homes generally means
consuming more water. Single family homeowners tend to use more
water than apartment owners, and large homes on large lots tend to
consume more water than small homes on small lots.' 2' So any tax
incentive that encourages sprawling development - and many
commentators argue that the mortgage interest deduction does so -
will also encourage water use.1 22
Again, however, the extent of that impact is difficult to discern,
largely because the extent to which the mortgage interest deduction
influences housing patterns is unclear.1 23 While it lowers homeowners'
tax liability - if those homeowners are wealthy enough to itemize
118 See, e.g., In re Application by Aqua N.C., Inc., No. W-218 Sub 319, 2011 WL
5345238 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 2011) (finding that a utility would be eligible for an
$85,246 section 199 deduction).
119 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2012).
120 COMM. ON THE EFFECTS OF PROVISIONS IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE ON
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
31 (William D. Nordhaus et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS].
121 See Ellen Hanak & Matthew Davis, Lawns and Water Demand in California, 2
CAL. ECON. POL'Y 1, 3 (2006).
122 See, e.g., Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden
Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1350-51, 1378-82
(2000). The National Research Council report on greenhouse gases and the tax code
illustrates the difficulties of calculating the environmental consequences of the
mortgage income deduction. The committee found few prior studies that attempted to
model those relationships, and their own modeling showed that eliminating the
deduction might actually increase greenhouse gas emissions, largely because removing
the deduction could increase overall economic output. See EFFECTS OF U.S. TAx POLICY
ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 120, at 127-28. But the committee also
noted that their model could not take into account several key variables, like the effect
of the deduction on housing size and driving patterns. See id. at 128.
123 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 16, at 221-22 (noting questions about
whether the deduction actually succeeds in encouraging homeownership).
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deductions - home buyers and sellers typically factor the deduction
into sale prices, and buyers therefore pay more for homes, negating
some of the homeownership incentives the deduction otherwise might
produce.1 24 Additionally, many other factors, like consumer
preferences, zoning restrictions, racial and class divisions, government
subsidies for road construction, and population growth have helped
advance the suburbanization of America.1 25 That suburbanization
clearly has increased water use, but the mortgage income deduction is
at most only a partial cause of the changes.
d. The Tax Implications of Water Transfers and Donations
In addition to encouraging or discouraging aggregate levels of water
use, tax provisions also may affect exchanges of water. The most likely
impacts fall upon transfers between consumptive water users and on
donations of water rights to conservation organizations. But here,
again, the importance of the incentives is difficult to discern and,
probably, minor.
i. Consumer-to-consumer transfers
In recent decades, water transfers have become increasingly
important to water policy and law.1 26 These transfers typically come in
several forms. Sometimes a transferor will sell its water rights to a
transferee.127 Often, for example, agricultural users with senior rights
will sell those rights to growing cities. 128 In other exchanges, the
transferee will pay for the ability to use water while the transferor
retains the underlying right, much like a renter paying for the right to
use a landlord's house.1 29 And sometimes the parties will negotiate
some form of option contract, under which the purchaser pays the
right-holder an annual fee and obtains, in return, the right to lease or
124 For questions about how much the deduction actually encourages
homeownership, see EFFECTS OF U.S. TAx POLIcY ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra
note 120, at 125.
125 See Jeremy R. Meredith, Note, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 89 VA. L.
REV. 447, 466-78 (2003) (summarizing the literature on causes of sprawl).
126 See generally W. GOVERNORS' AsS'N & W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, supra note 13
(summarizing trends and issues in water trading).
127 See, e.g., Jesse Reiblich & Christine A. Klein, Climate Change and Water
Transfers, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 439, 450 (2014).
128 See Thompson, Institutional Perspectives, supra note 49, at 701-02 (describing
the reasons for agricultural-urban transfers).
129 See Kuhnle, supra note 14, at 549 (discussing transferor's reservation of control
when licensing water rights).
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purchase water at a fixed price when the need later arises (typically
during a period of drought). 130 Water law once disfavored these kinds
of exchanges, but most western states have enacted reforms designed
to encourage transfers, on the general theory that mutually agreeable
exchanges offer a better way to reallocate water than regulatory
intervention or private litigation.131
The form of these transfers has tax implications. If a seller conveys
the underlying water right, it must pay capital gains tax on any
appreciation in the value of that right, but it may also pay reduced
property taxes because of the lowered value of its land.132 If, on the
other hand, the seller retains the underlying right but sells access to
the water, it has created a new income stream.1 33 A water right sale
therefore can generate a larger one-time tax bill. But because ordinary
income tax rates are typically higher than capital gains tax rates, there
are long-term advantages to structuring the deal as a right sale rather
than as a transfer of water. 134
But while these incentives exist, there is scant evidence that they
matter much. With rare exceptions, the abundant legal literature on
water transfers says hardly anything about taxes.1 35 In practice,
potential transferors seem far more concerned about the procedural
hurdles - which can be significant - associated with obtaining
governmental approvals of transfers.1 36
130 See CLAIRE D. TOMKINS ET AL., WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV'T, MANAGING WATER
SUPPLY UNCERTAINTY: OPTION CONTRACTS AND SHORT-TERM WATER TRANSFERS IN
CALIFORNIA, 4-6 (2008), http://woods.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/files/200809-
Policy-Brief- 1-Option-Contracts.pdf.
131 See W. GOVERNORS' AsS'N & W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 11-12,
29 (describing policy arguments favoring water transfers); Reiblich & Klein, supra
note 127, at 448-49 (describing growing support for water transfers).
132 See Kuhnle, supra note 14, at 544-45 (noting that the IRS determines value of
the water by subtracting the fair market value of the dry land from the sale price,
indicating the land has lost value).
133 See CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUALIZATION, supra note 102, at 7 (explaining that most
water transfers do not involve actual conveyances of property); Kuhnle, supra note 14,
at 543-44.
134 Kuhnle, supra note 14, at 547 (giving a hypothetical showing that considering
revenue from water sale as capital gains can reduce the seller's income taxes by nearly
50 percent).
135 The only academic publication to address the subject is Kuhnle, supra note 14.
And even Kuhnle observes that the tax implications of water transfers are "[llargely
overlooked." Id. at 536.
136 See W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N & W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 36
(noting the importance of transaction costs).
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ii. Conservation transfers
A somewhat thornier and more important tax issue arises with water
transfers from consumptive users to entities - often environmental
organizations - that wish to keep water in rivers or streams. Like
transfers among consumptive water users, these conservation-oriented
transfers have become increasingly popular, and more legally
accepted, in recent decades.1 37 Some conservation advocates and many
water right holders argue that voluntary transfers are a much better
way to secure environmental flows than regulatory interventions or
citizen lawsuits.1 38
This emergence of water conservation transfers parallels the
explosive growth of conservation-oriented transfers of land. Since the
1970s, land trusts have purchased millions of acres of fee simple
ownership rights and conservation easements.139 While altruistic
motivations play a part in these deals, the Internal Revenue Code also
helps.140 Section 170 allows landowners to claim charitable deductions
for donations to conservation groups, and landowners now claim over
a billion dollars in such tax deductions in an average year.141
Whether similar federal tax incentives are available for water
transfers is not clear.14 2 Internal Revenue Code subsection
170(f)(3)(A) limits taxpayers' ability to claim deductions for
donations of partial interests in property.1 43 That clearly eliminates
deductions for some types of water donations; a temporary donation,
for example, would not qualify.1 44 And even the status of long-term
137 See id. at 26.
138 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REv. 261, 272-76 (2000) [hereinafter Markets for Nature] (describing arguments
favoring water acquisitions as a protective strategy, as well as some associated
concerns).
139 See Private Lands Conservation: Conservation Easements, NATURE CONSERVANCY,
http://www.nature.org/about-us/private-lands-conservation/conservation-easements/
(last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (describing millions of acres of protection by The Nature
Conservancy alone).
14 For discussion of the growth - and growing pains - of the land conservation
movement, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st
Century: What Have We Learned and Where Should We Go From Here?, 2013 UTAH L.
REV. 687.
141 See id. at 716 (showing total numbers of donations and the average value of
those donations).
142 In Colorado, a state tax incentive clearly is available. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 39-
22-533 (2009).
143 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (2012).
144 See Mary Anne King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water Trusts, 28
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 495, 512-13 (2004) (noting that most purchases of conservation
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donations is somewhat uncertain. Because appropriative water rights
are severable from particular parcels of land and may be transferred
separately, some conservation groups have argued that the donation of
an entire appropriative right should be deductible.45 The IRS has not
rejected that position, and a few taxpayers have claimed that
deduction without their returns being challenged.1 46 But the IRS also
has declined, at least to date, to issue a revenue ruling affirming the
availability of tax deductions for donations of appropriative rights.
Even if it does issue such a ruling, it would apply only to appropriative
rights; the status of donations of riparian rights is likely to remain
ambiguous.1 47 Consequently, one of the most powerful tax incentives
for land conservation is available for water only on a limited and
uncertain basis.1 48
e. Efficiency Inconsistencies
A final area of interaction between federal income taxation and
water consumption involves the tax treatment of efficiency rebates.
That treatment is oddly paradoxical.
On the one hand, the Internal Revenue Code contains tax incentives
designed to promote energy efficiency.14 9 One of those incentive
provisions - section 45M - encourages energy efficiency by
encouraging water use efficiency.15 0 The best way to make a washing
machine or dishwasher more energy efficient is to make it use less
water. Therefore, section 45M allows tax deductions only for washing
water have been short-term and, therefore, ineligible for federal tax deductions).
145 See Letter from Tom Hicks et al., Res. Renewal Inst. to Assoc. Chief Counsel,
IRS (Oct. 30, 2012) (on file with author).
146 See Thomas Hicks, An Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury
Regulations Supporting the Tax Deductibility of the Voluntary Charitable Contribution in
Perpetuity of a Partial Interest in an Appropriative or Riparian Water Right Transferred
Instream for Conservation Purposes (with an Emphasis on California Water Law), 17
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 93, 106 (2011) (describing claimed
deductions).
147 Because traditional riparian rights were not severable from riparian parcels of
land, the donation of a riparian right would probably be considered to be a donation
of a partial interest. However, because many eastern states are moving away from
traditional riparian systems and toward "regulated riparianism," in which permit
systems allocate rights with varying degrees of fealty to traditional riparian principles,
the same arguments that favor deductions for appropriate right donations might also
favor deductions for water right donations in some eastern states.
148 See King, supra note 144, at 512 ("In practice, water trusts have been less
successful than land trusts in using tax deductions to promote transactions.").
149 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 45M (2012).
150 See id.
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machines and dishwashers that meet specific water use standards. 151
The code thus actively encourages some steps to increase residential
water use efficiency.
On the other hand, federal tax law undermines some state incentives
for water use efficiency. In some states, homeowners can obtain
rebates for tearing out lawns, replacing high-flush toilets, or installing
other water efficiency technology. 15 2 Those rebates not only serve the
policy goal of increasing water use efficiency; they also save energy by
lowering demand for pumped and treated water.1 53 In other words,
they serve the same policy goal as federal tax incentives for energy
efficiency. But the IRS treats those state rebates as taxable income. 154 A
homeowner who receives a rebate for installing a low-flow toilet,
therefore, must send a substantial portion of that rebate to the federal
government. 155
3. Water and Federal Excise Taxes
While income taxation may generate the longest list of intersections
between tax law and water policy, the most important intersection, at
least at the federal level, may come from a single exemption from one
particular excise tax. To promote production of biofuels - and,
ostensibly, to protect the environment 5 6 - the federal government
provides an excise tax exemption for ethanol production.1 57 That
151 See id. § 45M(b) (conditioning the eligibility of washing machines and
dishwashers on low water consumption).
152 See, e.g., Cal. Dep't Water Res., SAVE OUR WATER: REBATES, http://www.
saveourwaterrebates.com/ (last visited July 11, 2016) (describing water efficiency
rebates in California).
153 See Water-Energy Connection, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www3.epa.gov/
region9/waterinfrastructure/waterenergy.html (last visited July 11, 2016) ("Saving
[w]ater Is]aves [elnergy.").
154 See Darryl Fears, California's Drive to Save Water Is Killing Trees, Hurting Utilities and
Raising Taxes, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/1bd88a50-
d7ld-1 1e5-bl95-2e29a4el3425_story.html.
155 This was one of the unpleasant surprises your author encountered while filling
out his 2015 tax return.
156 The environmental rationale for biofuels is that because the carbon they contain
comes from the atmosphere (via plants), no aggregate increase in carbon will occur
when that carbon goes back to the atmosphere. The reality can be more complicated. See
Lifecycle Analysis of Greenhouse Gases Under the Renewable Fuel Standard, U.S. ENvTL.
PROT. AGENCY (last updated Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-
standard-program/lifecycle-analysis-greenhouse-gas-emissions-under-renewable-fuel.
157 See 26 U.S.C. § 40 (2012); see Federal Laws and Incentives for Ethanol, U.S.
DEP'T. ENERGY, ALT. FUELS DATA CTR., http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/laws/ETH/US
(last visited July 11, 2016) (excluding ethanol from a list of alternative fuels subject to
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exemption encourages the growth of crops that produce ethanol,
which, in the United States, means growing corn.1 58 And the amount
of corn grown for ethanol production is staggering. Corn occupies
more of the United States' land than any other crop,159 and more than
one third of that corn produces ethanol.1 60
But even with ethanol subsidies, the aggregate effects on water
consumption are unclear. Some corn grows in areas where irrigation is
necessary, but much of it grows in comparatively wet regions, where
rainfall alone suffices to water fields.161 For that reason, there is not a
direct, linear relationship between ethanol production and water
diversions.1 62 Additionally, ethanol production is not solely
attributable to the tax credit. Several other federal policies also
encourage, or even mandate, biofuel production.1 63 So while some
water consumption almost certainly is attributable to the ethanol fuel
mandate, exactly how much is far from clear.
In summary, tax law affects water use in a wide variety of ways,
most of them inadvertent and probably no more than modestly
consequential. A reasonable response to that conclusion might be to
propose a series of reforms. Congress could expressly limit section 175
deductions to activities that reduce water consumption, for example,
eliminate the section 199 deduction for potable water production, and
clarify that charitable deductions are available for conservation-
oriented donations of water rights. Similarly, water policy provides an
additional reason for older reform proposals, like eliminating the
mortgage interest deduction and the favorable tax treatment of
an excise tax).
158 See Amy Diggs, The Expiration of the Ethanol Tax Credit: An Analysis of Costs and
Benefits, 19 POL'Y PERSP. 47, 50 (2012) ("[C]orn makes up nearly all of the ethanol
produced in the United States.").
159 See U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., FARMS AND FARMLAND: NUMBERS, ACREAGE, OWNERSHIP,
AND USE 2 (2014), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_
Resources/Highlights/Farms-andFarmland/HighlightsFarms andFarmland.pdf.
160 Diggs, supra note 158, at 51 (providing statistics from 2010).
161 See Renee Cho, Ethanol's Impacts on Our Water Resources, COLUM. UNIV. STATE
OF THE PLANET (Mar. 21, 2011), http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2011/03/21/ethanol%
E2%80%99s-impacts-on-our-water-resources/.
162 This is particularly true because it is hard to determine whether fields currently
used for ethanol would simply be used for other crops if the mandate disappeared, and
because increased ethanol production may have pushed other crops to lands where
they would not otherwise have been grown.
163 See U.S DEP'T. OF ENERGY, ALT. FUELS DATA CTR., supra note 157.
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ethanol, for which proponents already have identified other
compelling policy justifications.164 Those are all sensible responses,
but the analysis that follows instead asks whether lawmakers ought to
do something more ambitious.
II. SHOULD WATER BE TAXED?
The central point of the previous section is that tax law in the
United States is mostly indifferent to water consumption. This part
confronts a larger question: should taxes be more of a part of water
law? Would it be wise, in areas that already have complicated water
law systems but also have continuing problems with water allocation,
to add a tax on water use? And what about a state, or a country, where
water law is not so developed? Should it build its system of water law
around a water tax?
My answer to these questions is a qualified yes. The supporting
argument rests on a series of steps, each explained in more detail
below. First, and notwithstanding some of the grand old myths of
water law, reducing water consumption is a desirable goal. Second,
taxation would help achieve those reductions; water use is generally
responsive to economic signals. Third, there are reasons why taxation
could achieve those reductions more efficiently and more equitably
than alternative modes of regulatory constraint - though, as I
explain, those advantages are not compelling enough to justify a
complete turn away from alternative regulatory approaches. Fourth,
and finally, water use is the kind of thing a government would be
justified in taxing. To many people, the idea of taxing water will seem
puzzling or even inappropriate. But that sense of oddity would arise
from novelty, and from a generalized and somewhat inchoate hostility
toward all forms of taxation, not from any compelling policy argument
against the taxation of water use.
A. The Case for Water Conservation
The basic premise of a Pigouvian tax scheme is that taxes ought to
encourage socially desirable activities and to discourage activities that
cause harm. But that principle raises a question: is water consumption
really socially harmful? After all, as the California Supreme Court once
164 See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of
the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 278-79 (2010)
(recording a litany of arguments against the mortgage interest deduction); Diggs,
supra note 158, at 56 (concluding that the ethanol incentive should be allowed to
expire).
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proclaimed, "[the prosperity and habitability of much of this state
requires the diversion of great quantities of water from its streams."1 65
California is hardly the only place that once adhered to this view.
Human civilization arose around water diversion, and westerners, who
were well aware of this reality, wrote provisions encouraging water
use, or equating private exploitation of water with public benefit, into
many of their state constitutions.1 66 For decades after those
constitutions went into effect, both the rhetoric of water use and the
on-the-ground realities of water development reflected a sense that a
river undammed and undiverted was a river wasted.1 67 That ideology
has long had its critics, and to many people today it seems obsolete.1 68
But it also has continued adherents, and even staunch critics of
traditional water ideologies would readily concede that societies must
use water for sanitation, drinking, and the production of food.169 A
legal scheme that discourages water use, therefore, might seem, to
some, to create exactly the wrong incentives.1 70
But even if some water consumption is indispensable to any society's
prosperity and well-being, many places would be better off consuming
less. 171 In the American West, and in much of the rest of the world,
165 Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal.
1983); see also Josh Patashnik, Arizona v. California and the Equitable Apportionment of
Interstate Waterways, 56 ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2014) (crediting the United States
Supreme Court, which ruled in Arizona's favor in a dispute over Colorado River water,
with enabling much of the state's economic success).
166 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 ("The right to divert the unappropriated
waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied."); IDAHO CONST.
art. XV, § 3 (same); WASH. CONST. art. XXI, § 1 ("The use of the waters of this state for
irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes shall be deemed a public use.").
167 Perhaps the clearest physical manifestation of this view is the Colorado River,
which now rarely wastes any water upon the sea. See Henry Brean, Colorado River
Could Reach the Sea for the First Time in Decades, L.V. REV.-J. (May 14, 2014, 2:18
PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/water-environmentL/colorado-river-could-
reach-sea-first-time-decades.
16s See, e.g., Jeffrey Mount, Water to the Sea Isn't Wasted, CAL. WATERBLOG (Mar. 1,
2011), https://californiawaterblog.com/2011/03/01/water-to-the-sea-isnt-wasted/.
169 See, e.g., Devin Nunes, It's Fish Versus Farmers in the San Joaquin Valley, WALL
STREET J. (Aug. 14, 2009, 11:26 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
5B10001424052970204619004574318621482123090 (lamenting that water "diverted"
into rivers to protect fish "is now flowing underneath the Golden Gate Bridge and out
into the Pacific Ocean.").
170 Increasing efficiency also can often have complex consequences on downstream
water users who benefited from excessive use. See Dave Owen, Overallocation, Conflict,
and Water Transfers, 9 ENvTL. RES. LETTERS 091005, at 1-2 (2014) [hereinafter
Overallocation].
171 Both aggregate and per capita water consumption in the United States are
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current water consumption levels simply cannot be sustained. 172 For
example, water levels in the Ogallala Aquifer, which supplies water to
farmers from the Texas Panhandle to South Dakota, have been
declining for decades, threatening the future of a huge and highly
productive agricultural region.173 California, to provide another
example, is pumping much more groundwater than nature
replenishes, especially during its current drought.174 It cannot
continue to do so unless people are willing to pay the massive energy
costs associated with pumping and treating saline groundwater from
deep below the earth's surface.175 Similar problems pervade the
southwest. 176 And global consumption of groundwater exceeds
recharge by such a wide margin that the transfer of groundwater to
land and, eventually, the seas is actually making the oceans
measurably higher.177 Surface water systems across much of the world
are similarly overtaxed, with one recent study predicting that "by
2050, the population at risk of exposure to at least a moderate level of
water stress could reach at least 5 billion people."1 78
All of this water use has problematic secondary consequences.
Competition for scarce water resources generates political conflict and
litigation.1 79 In some places - a few in the United States, and many in
actually decreasing, so trends toward increased water scarcity are by no means
universal. See Peter H. Gleick & Meena Palaniappan, Peak Water Limits to Freshwater
Withdrawal and Use, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ScL. 11155, 11160 (2010). But they are
pervasive enough to be very problematic.
172 See Peter H. Gleick, Roadmap for Sustainable Water Resources in Southwestern
North America, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sc. 21300, 21300 (2010).
173 See Ian James & Steve Reilly, Pumped Beyond Limits, Many U.S. Aquifers in
Decline, DESERT SUN, Dec. 10, 2015, http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/
environment/2015/12/10/pumped-beyond-limits-many-us-aquifers-decline/76570380/.
174 See J. S. Famiglietti et al., Satellites Measure Recent Rates of Groundwater
Depletion in California's Central Valley, 38 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, no. L03403, Feb.
2011, at 1, 3-4 (2011) (warning - before the onset of the recent drought - of "dire
consequences" of groundwater depletion).
175 See Juliet Christian-Smith, Leave California's 'New' Water in the Ground, L.A.
TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-christian-smith-
aquifers-california-20160706-snap-story.html.
176 See, e.g., ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE
FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS (2002); Stephanie L. Castle et al., Groundwater
Depletion During Drought Threatens Future Water Security of the Colorado River Basin,
41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 5904 (2014).
177 See Leonard F. Konikow, Contribution of Global Groundwater Depletion Since 1900
to Sea-Level Rise, 38 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, no. L17401, Sept. 2, 2011, at 1, 4-5.
178 SCHLOSSER ET AL., supra note 3, at 24.
179 See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir.
2003) ("One of the most contentious issues in the western United States is the
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the developing world - water scarcity takes a heavy toll on the poor,
forcing them to spend more time and money procuring supplies or to
rely on unsafe sources. 80 Indeed, in less stable parts of the world,
some evidence suggests that water scarcity contributes to wars.181
Water consumption is also highly energy-intensive, and, therefore,
often requires burning fossil fuels. This contributes to climate change,
which then - among other consequences - tends to make water
stress worse. 182 Other environmental consequences of water use are
also often drastic. Aquatic ecosystems around the world are
chronically stressed, and water diversions are a primary cause.183
Many of these consequences are avoidable. Large amounts of water
go to uses - overwatering lawns,18 4 using inefficient irrigation
systems,185 or generating animal feed,186 - that could be reduced
management of water resources."); Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't. of
Water Res., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 185 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Shortage precipitates
conflict.").
180 See, e.g., Faissal Tarrass & Meryem Benjelloun, The Effects of Water Shortages on
Health and Human Development, 132 PERSP. PUB. HEALTH 240 (2012) (describing
widespread and devastating effects of inadequate sanitation); Andrea Castillo, Drought
Disaster in East Porterville Turns to Budding Health Crisis, FRESNO BEE (June 20, 2015),
http//www.fresnobee.cominews/local/water-and-drought/article25023559.html (detailing
the many health problems arising from water shortage).
181 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Without Water, Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2013, at SRI (describing Syria's drought and its contribution to civil war). But see
Vally Koubi et al., Do Natural Resources Matter for Interstate and Intrastate Armed
Conflict?, 51 J. PEACE RES. 227, 228-29 (2013) (finding mixed evidence to support the
hypothesis that water scarcity leads to conflict).
182 See CAL. DEP'T. OF WATER RES., MANAGING FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA'S WATER 8 (2008) (" [W] ater-related
energy use in California also consumes approximately 20 percent of the state's
electricity, and 30 percent of the state's non-power plant natural gas (i.e. natural gas
not used to produce electricity).").
183 See Anthony Ricciardi & Joseph B. Rasmussen, Extinction Rates of North
American Freshwater Fauna, 13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1220, 1221-22 (1999) (finding
high extinction rates for freshwater species); Cj. Vorosmarty et al., Global Threats to
Human Water Security and River Biodiversity, 467 NATURE 555, 555 (2010).
184 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 8 (noting that as much as fifty percent
of lawn irrigation is wasted).
185 See Tianyi Zhang et al., Adaptation of Irrigation Infrastructure on Irrigation
Demands Under Future Drought in the United States, 19 EARTH INTERACTIONS, Mar.
2015, at 1, 5 ("More than 60% of the irrigation areas in the west were surface
irrigation systems with relatively less efficiency compared with eastern systems . . . ").
186 See Mario Herrero et al., Biomass Use, Production, Feed Efficiencies, and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Global Livestock Systems, 110 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. Sa.
20888, 20888 (2013) (noting that livestock production consumes one third of global
freshwater withdrawals).
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without any great loss of social welfare, and sometimes with collateral
gains. Statistics on aggregate water use also suggest that many people
consume much more water than they really need. There is no obvious
reason, for example, why Americans need 37% more water, per capita,
than Australians, or 461% more than Israelis.187
In short, water use is not an unqualified social bad, quite the way
emitting noxious pollution might be. It generates a mix of benefits and
costs. But that balance of benefits and costs - and the simple and
harsh reality that some places do not have enough water to sustain
present use practices - justifies incentives to use less.
B. Taxes as Conservation Tools
Even if consuming less water is desirable, taxation might not be an
effective way of achieving that outcome. As behavioral economists are
fond of noting, people are not always economically rational actors, and
sometimes price signals do not produce behavioral changes.188
Similarly, economics is not always simple, and pricing policies can
produce counterintuitive results. 189 Or sometimes they cannot even be
implemented; if, for example, government lacks information about
water use, it will be very difficult to tax that use.190 But a substantial
body of literature (most of it deriving from studies of water sale
pricing rather than water taxation) suggests that water taxation would
change water use. And the informational challenges of water taxation,
though significant, are surmountable.
187 See The World Factbook, Field Listing: Freshwater Withdrawal
(Domestic/Industrial/Agricultural), CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2202.html (last visited July 12, 2016).
Similar disparities between the United States and the developed economies of
northern Europe might be explained partly by climate, but Australia and Israel face
similar, if not greater, challenges with aridity.
188 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051,
1053, 1143-44 (2000).
189 See, e.g., EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMIssIONs, supra note
120 (predicting many counterintuitive consequences from changes in the tax code).
190 See Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-
Enforcement in the Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REv. 2539, 2539 (2015) (noting
the importance of information to effective taxation).
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1. The Effects of Price Incentives on Water Use
For years, economists have studied homeowners' responses to water
prices.191 The results of those studies are mixed, but most conclude
that homeowners' water use is moderately sensitive to at least some
economic incentives. In particular, when water charges are relatively
high, or when prices change dramatically, residential users tend to
respond.1 92 Similarly, longer time periods facilitate larger responses.1 93
That makes sense. The most effective measures to reduce residential
water use typically involve replacing thirsty plants with drought-
tolerant landscaping and removing high-flow toilets and faucets, and
homeowners sometimes need time and continued economic prodding
to get around to making such improvements. But the long-term
effectiveness of price incentives is now sufficiently established that
some economists argue that pricing is clearly the best way for
municipalities to respond to droughtS1 94 - and criticize water
suppliers for preferring less economically efficient solutions.195
Homeowners are relatively minor players in the water world, and in
most areas, the real impact of a water tax will depend on how
agricultural, industrial, and commercial users respond.1 96 For
agriculture in particular, the effects of pricing incentives appear to be
powerful. One meta-analysis of over twenty-four price elasticity
studies concluded that "in the long run, where changes in crops and
irrigation technologies are options, irrigation water delivery demand is
... likely to be fairly responsive to price."1 97 Other studies have
19' See STEVEN RENZETTI, THE ECONOMICS OF WATER DEMANDS 21-34 (2002)
(summarizing studies).
192 See, e.g., Shanthi Nataraj, Do Residential Water Consumers React to Price
Increases? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Santa Cruz, 10 AGRIC. & RESOURCE
ECON. UPDATE, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 9 (finding low elasticity for users who paid low
prices but greater elasticity for high-price consumers).
193 See Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 24, at 4.
194 See id. at 3.
195 See, e.g., Erin T. Mansur & Sheila M. Olmstead, The Value of Scarce Water:
Measuring the Inefficiency of Municipal Regulations, 71 J. URBAN ECON. 332 (2012)
(noting that policy makers have used command and control applications for water
rationing and arguing that these polices are likely not efficient).
196 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., supra note 7 (observing that seventy percent of the
world's freshwater withdrawals are for agricultural use); Agriculture at a Crossroads,
GLOBAL AGRIC., http://www.globalagriculture.org/report-topics/water.html (last visited
Jan. 5, 2017).
197 Susanne M. Scheierling et al., Irrigation Water Deman& A Meta-Analysis of Price
Elasticities, 42 WATER RESOURCES RES., No. W0141 1, Jan. 2006, at 1, 1, 8.
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corroborated that conclusion.19 8 The consensus is not complete, and
outcomes vary based on the places studied and the crops grown.199 But
even though points of disagreement remain, the weight of these
studies supports the conclusion that agricultural water use is generally
responsive to economic incentives. Research on industrial and
commercial water use, though less extensive, points toward similar
conclusions.200 As Olmstead and Stavins report, "[ilndustrial price
elasticity estimates for water tend to be higher than residential
estimates and vary by industry." 201 Consequently, while price
sensitivities are likely to be heterogeneous, both agricultural and
industrial users are generally likely to change water use in response to
taxation.
2. The Informational Challenges of Water Taxation
Even if tax incentives could, in theory, shift water use, a government
agency must know something about water use in order to impose
those taxes. More specifically, to administer a tax effectively, the
government agency responsible for implementing the tax must know,
first, who is engaged in the taxed activity or owns the taxed property,
and, second, the extent of that activity or value of that property.202
Potential taxpayers also must believe there will be audits and
enforcement proceedings if required payments are not made, or else
cheating will be rampant. 203 Administration, in short, requires
information, and a credible threat that the information will be used.
198 See, e.g., Ziv Bar-Shira et al., Block-Rate Versus Uniform Water Pricing in
Agriculture: An Empirical Analysis, 88 AM.J. AGRIC. EcON. 986, 998 (2006).
199 See Michael R. Moore et al., Multicrop Production Decisions in Western Irrigated
Agriculture: The Role of Water Price, 76 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON. 859, 872 (1994) (noting
that responses vary by crop, and also that responses tend to occur through longer-
term decisions like crop allocation and selection of irrigation technology); Beau Olen
et al., Irrigation Decisions for Major West Coast Crops: Water Scarcity and Climatic
Determinants, AM. J. AGRIc. ECON., at 1, 18 (July 15, 2015), http://ajae.
oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/06/15/ajae.aavO36 (finding variability based on
a long list of factors); Scheierling et al., supra note 197, at 1 (noting past studies that
find responsiveness only with very large price increases).
200 See RENZETTI, supra note 191, at 38-47 (summarizing studies).
201 Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 24, at 4.
202 See generally Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Putting Firms into Optimal Tax
Theory, 96 AM. EcoN. REv. 130 (2006) (noting the essential role information plays in
taxation).
203 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 16, at 174, 186-88 (explaining the importance
of enforcement and the need for information to support that enforcement).
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But many states have poor records of water use. In some areas -
even fairly dry ones - agricultural surface water use goes unmeasured
and unreported, and individual farmers simply take what they need so
long as the water is available in the ditch.204 Groundwater use is even
less likely to be measured. Because individual farmers and
homeowners typically operate their own wells, rather than obtaining
water from some third party that might want to be paid on a per-
volume basis, they generally have no need to tell anyone how much
they are actually using.205 And regulatory requirements for
groundwater use reporting are limited.206 Urban water suppliers are
much more likely to measure individual users' water consumption, but
not all of them do; in some municipalities, water users still pay flat
rates for access, regardless of the water volume they actually
consume. 207 That means the information that would support a tax on
water consumption is often absent.208
An alternative approach - to tax water rights rather than water
consumption - might seem more feasible, for some states have better
documentation of rights than of actual uses. But that approach would
generate even greater problems. There can be substantial gaps between
water rights and actual consumption, 209 and if the primary goal of a
204 See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DOCUMENTATION OF
METHODS AND INVENTORY OF IRRIGATION DATA COLLECTED FOR THE 2000 AND 2005 U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY: ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES, COMPARISON OF
USGS-COMPILED IRRIGATION DATA TO OTHER SOURCES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FUTURE COMPILATIONS 2 (2011) ("[Tlhe majority of irrigation withdrawals are not
metered in the United States."); Stephanie Lindsay, Counting Every Drop: Measuring
Surface and Ground Water in Washington and the West, 39 ENVTL. L. 193, 196 (2009)
(noting that while Washington State had adopted metering requirements, no other
western state had done so - though Kansas' program comes close). Even where no
statewide metering requirement exists, individual water suppliers may impose such
requirements. See id. at 205 (describing district-level requirements in Texas).
205 See Owen, Taking Groundwater, supra note 44, at 262 (noting that this feature
makes groundwater a particularly appealing water source).
206 See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE WATER WITHDRAWAL
REGULATIONS (2013) (describing state groundwater regulatory programs, many of
which are filled with exemptions).
207 See Paul Rogers, California Drought: More than 255,000 Homes and Businesses Still
Don't Have Water Meters Statewide, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016),
http//www.mercurynews.com/2014/03/08/california-drought-more-than-255000-homes-
and-businesses-still-dont-have-water-meters-statewide/.
208 See Ted Grantham & Joshua Viers, California Water Rights: You Can't Manage
What You Don't Measure, CAL. WATER BLOG (Aug. 20, 2014), https://
californiawaterblog.com/2014/08/20/california-water-rights-you-cant-manage-what-
you-dont-measure/.
209 These gaps can arise for several reasons. First, sometimes there is not enough
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tax is to encourage greater efficiency of water use, focusing on a
flawed proxy for actual use makes little sense. Additionally, in many
parts of the country, water rights are even more indeterminate than
actual water use. Traditional riparian rights, for example, allow
"reasonable" use of a watercourse, with reasonableness defined in
relation to other competing uses and to social values, both of which
can change over time. 210 The resulting formula is notoriously
imprecise.211 Similarly, most of the traditional doctrines defining
groundwater use rights lack numeric precision, and instead entitle
users to take a reasonable share of the aquifer or, in some states, as
much as they can get. 212
Because of these information gaps, water taxes may sound
impossible to implement. But there are three key reasons why the idea
should not be dismissed so quickly. First, though major information
gaps remain, some states are moving toward greater measurement and
quantification. 21 3 Colorado, for example, now has a robust statewide
system of water use monitoring.2 14 California has traditionally been
more of a laggard, but its governor recently issued an executive order
requiring more monitoring and reporting of surface diversions. 215 The
California Legislature also passed a separate bill that empowers local
agencies to require monitoring of groundwater use.216 Similarly,
legislative changes and lawsuits have led to tighter monitoring of
water to fulfill junior users' paper rights. Second, users do not always choose to use all
the water to which they are legally entitled. See Hanemann, supra note 58, at 72-73
n.23 (noting that on the ground, practices in western states often depart from the
appropriative systems that exist on paper). Third, some major uses are non-
consumptive. For example, power plants often return their cooling water to
waterways, and the water consumption associated with hydropower generation is
generally minimal.
210 See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 33-35.
211 Id. at 35 ("The lack of predictability of outcomes is an oft-criticized aspect of
riparian doctrine.").
212 See Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 153 (Me. 1999) (retaining the absolute
dominion rule, which allows essentially unlimited pumping); Sipriano v. Great Spring
Waters of America, Inc. 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999) (retaining the rule of capture,
which gives landowners a right to however much groundwater they can pump, in
Texas); THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 467-68.
213 See generally ALVAR ESCRIVA-BOU ET AL., ACCOUNTING FOR CALIFORNIA'S WATER:
TECHNICAL APPENDIX (2016) (describing water use monitoring systems in the western
United States, Australia, and Spain).
214 Id. at 44-54.
215 Cal. Exec. Order No. B-29-15, 19 9-10 (Apr. 1, 2015).
216 CAL. WATER CODE i 10725.8 (2017).
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water withdrawals in Washington state.217 Many steps remain to be
taken, but water management is grudgingly moving into the
information age.
Second, carefully designed taxes can encourage water users to
provide more information. In a state where water rights are carefully
documented but water use is poorly measured, taxes might be based,
as a default, on the face value of a water right, but water users could
reduce their tax bills by showing a lesser quantity of use. 218 Or,
alternatively, the tax collecting agency could calculate water use based
on proxies like the crop selection and irrigation method, and water
users would then bear the burden of proving that the model had
overestimated their use.219 Either approach would encourage private
users to provide information about their actual water consumption.
Similarly, water users who only partly consume the water they divert,
and who return some of that water to the environment, might obtain a
partial reduction in their tax bills if they measure and report their
return flows. 220
Third, these informational challenges are not unique to taxation.
Almost any effective system for regulating water use demands
information. 221 One cannot ensure the success of a permit system
without knowing how much water other permittees are allowed to
take, and how much they are actually taking. 222 Nor can a water
trading system work effectively without information about water
allocations; a market without informed buyers and sellers cannot
217 See Lindsay, supra note 204, at 200-04, 206-08 (describing Washington's and
Kansas' efforts); Measuring Water Use, WASH. DEP'T ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/
programs/wr/measuring/measuringhome.html (last visited July 12, 2016).
218 A potential problem with this proxy approach is that it would undertax
particularly profligate users of water, and finding those uses might require some
focused detection efforts.
219 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 204
(describing methods for estimating water use in the absence of metering data).
220 Return flows contain water that neither evaporates nor is transpired by plants,
and that instead flows back into a natural waterway. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note
35, at 174.
221 Of course, this is one reason why metering is sometimes unpopular. See Rogers,
supra note 207 (quoting an anti-tax activist and metering opponent in Fresno,
California: "The bureaucrats want a guaranteed method of a cash register that they can
manipulate.").
222 See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Administrative State, 45 UC DAVIS L. REv. 1099, 1147-50 (2012) [hereinafter Mono
Lake Case] (describing information deficits in traditional water regulation, and the
difficulties those deficits create).
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function efficiently and may not be able to function at all.223
Information deficits, in other words, are challenges for any regulatory
system, and the proper response is to fix the information deficits, not
to eschew taxation as a regulatory approach. Fixes will not happen
overnight, and any jurisdiction considering a water tax should
consider whether it has the needed information, and, if not, how that
information will be obtained. But while information deficits may
inform the design and timing of a water tax, they should not preclude
its adoption.
C. Taxes or Other Regulatory Controls?
Even if taxes would encourage more efficient water use, and more
efficient water use is a desirable outcome, that does not necessarily
mean taxes should be adopted. A tax is just one of many regulatory
options, and water suppliers have traditionally turned to a wide variety
of other controls. In urban areas, suppliers have used service charges,
water rationing, bans on certain water uses, building code
requirements, and educational programs to try to limit water use.224
State and federal regulators, meanwhile, have turned to water use
permitting systems, which generally are highly integrated with
statutory environmental laws.225 This entire system intertwines - or,
sometimes, conflicts - with a property and contractual rights system
designed to allocate water among competing users.226 One might ask,
then, what a tax could add, or how it would be better than these
traditional approaches.
1. Taxes or Traditional Regulation? 227
In the past, when governmental entities have decided that water use
poses problems, they often have reacted by either regulating the
223 See Hanemann, supra note 58, at 72-73 n.23.
224 See Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 24, at 3 ("Rationing approaches to water
conservation are ubiquitous.").
225 See Owen, Mono Lake Case, supra note 222, at 1115-18 (describing California's
administrative system).
226 See, e.g., Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case, Water Rights, the Endangered
Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551 (2002); John D. Leshy, A
Conversation About Takings and Water Rights, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1985 (2005).
227 Economists and legal scholars often use the phrase "command and control" to
describe traditional forms of regulation. But that phrase tends to be much clearer in its
pejorative overtones than its actual content, and I prefer the more neutral phrase
"traditional regulation." As the discussion below will make clear, that phrase also
serves as an umbrella term for a wide variety of regulatory approaches.
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amount of water people can use, banning or limiting certain water-
use-intensive activities, or placing limits on specific secondary
consequences of water consumption. 228 Water rationing or watering
bans provide an example of the former approach; 229 bans on high-flow
toilets exemplify the middle strategy; 230 and a law like the Endangered
Species Act, which prohibits some actions that harm threatened or
endangered species, exemplifies the latter.231 Presumably these
regulatory instruments became popular for at least some good reasons,
and their entrenchment raises questions about what advantages, if any,
taxation could offer.
For many environmental economists, and to the many legal thinkers
who have been influenced by economic theory, the answer to that
question is easy. Taxes, in their view, are generally superior to
traditional regulatory systems. Those traditional regulatory systems, in
their view, are chronically insensitive to the differences among
regulated entities.232 A ban on high-flow toilets, for example, does
nothing to constrain the water use of the homeowner who resorts to
double-flushing, or who reinstalls a high-flow toilet, assuming,
probably correctly, that he will not be caught.233 Nor does it account
for the possibility that the same homeowner might save much more
water, and do so much more cheaply, by xeriscaping his yard. Nor,
finally, do most traditional regulatory systems induce people to weigh
the relative value of highly different water uses; the farmer and the
microchip manufacturer are not measured on any kind of common
scale.234
228 See Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 24, at 3.
229 See Bettina Boxall, New Watering Restrictions Imposed Amid California Drought,
L.A. TIMEs (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-state-officials-
watering-restrictions-20150317-story.html.
230 See, e.g., Melody Gutierrez, California Drought: Toilets, Faucets Sold in '16 Must
Be Low-Flow, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 9, 2015, 10:25 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/
article/California-drought-Toilets-faucets-sold-in-2016-6187726.php.
231 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
232 See, e.g., Jean-Philippe Barde & Olivier Godard, Economic Principles of
Environmental Fiscal Reform, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION,
supra note 17, at 35 (asserting that traditional regulatory controls "impose uniform
requirements" because regulators lack individualized information about regulated
entities).
233 See Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 24, at 4 (noting the potential for multiple
rebound effects and other reactions that thwart a traditional regulation's goals).
234 One possible exception to this general statement is a system that allows water
trading. But, for reasons discussed in more depth below, that is likely to be a very
partial solution. See infra notes 257-71 and accompanying text.
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The beauty of a price instrument, by contrast, is that it achieves
efficiency by letting private decision-makers allocate the burdens of
environmental protection. 235 It does so by reaching every water user
and imposing a price commensurate with the overall social cost of
water use, while also leaving each user discretion to draw upon her
own knowledge and make her own decisions. 23 6 So, for example, a tax
would allow a farmer who produces high value crops with excellent
water efficiency to keep pumping, while encouraging another farmer
who produces an economically marginal alfalfa crop to fallow his
fields. Similarly, the tax would catch the high-flow-toilet-reinstaller or
the double-flusher, while traditional regulation probably will not.237
The net result of this combination of broad reach and individual
discretion can be a huge aggregate cost savings.238
Advocates of incentive-based regulation also argue that traditional
regulation is exceedingly difficult to implement, both because it is
cumbersome and because regulatory decisions become fraught with
politics and rent-seeking. 239 There is something to these critiques.
Individualized water permitting processes can be incredibly time-
consuming, and one of the most common complaints of water users is
that both agencies and courts make decisions about water at glacial
speed. 240 Because those decision-making processes can be so slow,
regulatory agencies also are reluctant to initiate them, and traditional
water users are often able to continue their water uses largely
unrestrained, even when those uses impose substantial social costs. 24 1
235 See NATHANIEL 0. KEOHANE & SHEILA M. OLMSTEAD, MARKETS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 133-37 (2d ed. 2007).
236 See Hsu, supra note 15, at 33-34 (describing similar benefits for a carbon tax);
Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 101-02 (arguing that the reality of limited
governmental knowledge makes Pigouvian taxation a superior regulatory instrument).
237 See Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 24, at 4-5 (discussing how other regulatory
restrictions can produce evasion and unintended "rebound effects").
238 See id. at 8.
239 See, e.g., Barde & Godard, supra note 232, at 57; Masur & Posner, supra note
15, at 139-40.
24 See, e.g., Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Rethinking the Use of General Stream
Adjudications, 15 WYo. L. RiEv. 347, 349 (2015) (noting that general stream
adjudications, a common mechanism for resolving a wide set of water right claims, are
widely criticized as "cumbersome"); Steve Brown, Part of Water Right Processing Moves
to Private Sector, CAPITAL PRESS, Nov. 29, 2012 (describing Washington's backlog of
7,000 water right applications).
241 See Owen, Mono Lake Case, supra note 222, at 1134-35 (describing California's
lack of review of water use under existing rights). See generally Janet C. Neuman,
Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western
Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998) (documenting the reluctance of regulators and
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And traditional regulation clearly is sometimes dominated by interest
group politics.242 A tax, then, does provide an enticing alternative. It
could be much simpler than a regulatory system, demand less
information, reach more broadly yet allow greater individual
autonomy, and be harder for rent-seekers to distort.
But these arguments are often overstated. As numerous
commentators have pointed out, rent-seeking and public choice
politics offer only limited explanatory value for many traditional
regulatory regimes.243 Much regulatory governance - particularly in
the environmental realms that overlap so heavily with water law - is
more easily explained by theories that view protection of public
interests as a genuine regulatory goal, not a smokescreen behind
which special interests use government authority to bludgeon each
other.244 Conversely, the notion that taxes will be insulated from
political influence is belied by the tax codes the United States actually
has.245 Clearly, the ability of powerful interests to secure loopholes
and favors does not disappear when legislators turn from drafting
regulatory statutes to amending or expanding tax codes.246
Alternative regulatory systems also tend to be more flexible than the
caricatures that often appear in economics-infused legal literature.
Most of those traditional systems employ flexible permitting regimes,
combinations of performance and technology standards, informational
regulation, planning mechanisms, and incentive-based schemes, often
courts to demand greater efficiency from existing water users).
242 See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established
Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENVTL.
L. 881, 888 (1998) (describing widespread and largely politically-motivated deference
to existing uses). Within the literature on environmental regulation, the classic study
of interest group influence is BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN
COAIDIRTY AIR, OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT
FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981).
243 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 59, 62-63 (1992) (questioning accounts that attribute environmental
regulation primarily to rent-seeking).
244 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small
Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 147-48, 187-88 (2012) [hereinafter Critical Habitat]
(documenting public-service-oriented approaches to endangered species protection);
Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1.
245 See supra notes 119-25, 156-63 (describing critiques of ethanol subsidies and
the mortgage interest deduction - among many other tax code provisions subject to
widespread criticism).
246 See David M. Driesen, The Limits of Pricing Carbon, 4 CLIMATE L. 107, 114
(2014) ("[Mlost pollution taxes become riddled with complex exemptions that take
time to negotiate.").
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mixing them up in ways that defy any simple effort to shoehorn a
regulatory system in to a specific theoretical model. 247 That flexibility
makes regulatory systems difficult to understand, but it also has
virtues. Most importantly, it allows regulators and regulated entities to
tailor regulatory approaches to the circumstances before them - and,
sometimes, to exempt harmless instances of otherwise regulated
activities from governmental constraint.2 48 A tax, for all its elegant
simplicity, can be comparatively blunt. 249
But even with those caveats, the arguments in favor of taxation are
powerful. it can reach users who have largely been insulated from
traditional regulatory controls.250 It can leave key decisions up to
bounded individual discretion, rather than presuming governmental
knowledge about the most effective ways to reduce water use.251 It
provides an effective common metric for evaluating water use, which
could help facilitate reallocation of water both among and within
different sectors of the economy. 252 It can coexist with other regulatory
systems. And, perhaps most importantly, while traditional regulatory
approaches have their defenders, hardly anyone argues that they have
completely succeeded in generating good water use policies. There
clearly is room for alternative approaches and some additional help.
2. Taxes or Trading?
A skeptic of traditional regulation might readily agree with the
preceding discussion but nevertheless ask, why taxes? After all, the
247 See Owen, Critical Habitat, supra note 244, at 197-98 (noting that a diversity of
regulatory options is a common feature of environmental law).
248 See id. (arguing that giving agencies a range of instruments to choose from has
value).
249 See Fleischer, supra note 18, at 1676-77 (arguing that Pigouvian taxation
schemes inappropriately assume that the marginal cost of each instance of the
regulated activity is the same, when in fact those costs can vary widely). Fleischer's
point has some resonance with water, for the negative impacts of water use will vary
depending upon the place and purpose of use. But that variability is a problem for any
regulatory scheme that relies upon broad rules. See Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at
138 (offering this critique of Fleischer's argument). Tax schemes also can include
exemptions that account for some of the variability in social costs, though such
exemptions necessarily make the tax more complicated.
250 See Hsu, supra note 15, at 38-40 (noting that alternative regulatory schemes
often leave out smaller sources, while a tax need not do so).
251 See Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 101 (discussing the challenges
information shortfalls pose for traditional regulation).
252 See PETER W. CULP ET AL., SHOPPING FOR WATER: HOW THE MARKET CAN MITIGATE
WATER SHORTAGES IN THE AMERICAN WEST 10 (2014) (describing huge disparities
created by current pricing systems).
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basic premise of water taxation - that economic incentives would
bring greater rationality to water policy - is not at all new; for
decades, it has animated proposals for reform. 253 The more commonly
suggested alternative, however, has been a system in which water
rights can be transferred among willing sellers and buyers.254 The
possibility of trading, according to reformers, creates powerful
incentives for increasing the efficiency of water use; now a low-value
user can install water conservation technology, or simply abandon
low-value uses, and sell the newly-created excess. 255 In accordance
with those recommendations, many western states have reformed their
water law systems to facilitate trading, and water trading volumes have
grown. 256 One might ask, then, what advantages taxation offers over
these reforms that are already in place.
One significant advantage is broader coverage. Trading creates
powerful conservation incentives for potential sellers that actually can
get their water to willing buyers. But in many places, transporting
water is hard to do. Because of its bulk, water is usually prohibitively
expensive to truck, and moving it requires pipelines, ditches, or
canals. 257 But the United States does not have a public canal or
pipeline system comparable to our public highway systems. Even
private water delivery systems, if they are available to the transferring
parties, go only limited sets of places. 258 That problem is widespread
for surface water, and infrastructure for transporting groundwater is
even less likely to be available - if such trades are even legal. 259 The
consequence, throughout much of the West, is a geographically patchy
transfer system, with many would-be sellers and buyers either unable
253 See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISIBLE PUMP 134 (1997); Thomas J. Graff & David Yardas, Reforming Western Water
Policy: Markets and Regulation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 165 (1998).
254 See, e.g., CULP ET AL., supra note 252, at 11-12; Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights,
Markets, and Changing Ecological Conditions, 42 ENVTL. L. 93, 101-02 (2012).
255 See CULP ET AL., supra note 252, at 11-12; W. STATES GOVERNORS' ASS'N & W.
STATES WATER COUNCIL, supra note 13, at ix.
256 See W. STATES GOVERNORS' AsS'N & W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, supra note 13,
at 9 (showing growing numbers of transactions).
257 See Gleick & Palaniappan, supra note 171, at 11157.
258 See CULP ET AL., supra note 252, at 11 (noting the importance of physical
restrictions on transfers).
259 See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 467 (describing the correlative rights
doctrine for groundwater, which gives priority to overlying users, and would allow
them to enjoin off-site uses (and thus trading) where a groundwater surplus does not
exist); Owen, Taking Groundwater, supra note 44, at 262 (noting that the appeal of
groundwater is partly that it does not require transportation infrastructure).
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to access a larger market or able to reach only limited sets of buyers.260
Because of that isolation, the potential efficiencies of markets are likely
to fall well short of their proponents' aspirations. 261 A tax, by contrast,
could reach everywhere, providing conservation incentives even where
the possibility of direct trades does not exist.
A second significant advantage involves the allocation of cost
burdens. In a transfer-based system, at least as envisioned by many of
its strongest proponents, existing water right holders occupy a
distinctly advantaged position. Their water uses would generally be
presumed inviolate, and are subject to change only if someone pays
compensation for the shift.262 That presumption would have
advantages - most importantly, it provides clarity, which makes it
easier for buyers and sellers to know what they are transferring - and
it also accords with the way we often treat property rights. 263 But if
those existing uses have been generating large and uncompensated
externalities - and doing so by appropriating a partially public
resource - then simply privileging existing uses creates a windfall.264
Or, to put the point in more practical terms, it means that any
protection for uses that traditional water allocations did not directly
value - including, most importantly, environmental protection -
260 See, e.g., Hanak et al., supra note 60, at 35 (noting that transfers in California
are limited by the need to move water across the Sacramento/San Joaquin Bay-Delta,
where regulatory restrictions on water pumping apply).
261 See CULP ET AL., supra note 252, at 11 (noting that physical limits on water
availability can lead to huge disparities in water prices).
262 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Institutional Constraints on Transboundary Water
Marketing, in WATER MARKETING - THE NEXT GENERATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
FORUM 31, 38-39 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) (criticizing laws,
including environmental restrictions, that undermine the certainty of water rights).
For this reason, traditional water trading is quite different from cap-and-trade systems,
where overall shares of the activity or resource are limited and trading occurs beneath
a cap (which may decline over time). It stands in even greater contrast to auctioned
cap-and-trade systems, in which participants must pay for their initial shares.
263 See Adler, supra note 254, at 102 (noting that certainty facilitates trading).
264 See Freyfogle, Common Wealth, supra note 56, at 2-5 (developing this critique of
water transfers). In response to this argument, some commentators have argued that
there is no windfall because water subsidies are reflected in prices paid for land, and
most land has changed hands since water supplies first appeared. That argument is
flawed in two respects. First, it overlooks the basic reality that the private seller, not
the public that supplies the water, was the payment recipient. In other words, it is
somewhat like arguing that my children's public education is not subsidized because I
paid a lot for my house. Second, it assumes equivalency in between the public benefit
received and the private payments made. But proponents of this argument have not
explained the empirical basis for that assumption.
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will exist only to the extent that someone is willing to pay.265 To
impose a tax that demands compensation for environmental harms, by
contrast, accords with the basic principle that water users retain some
level of public duty, even if they hold and exercise private rights. 266
A third significant advantage involves transaction costs. Because
transfers routinely have third-party impacts, most western states have
created administrative processes for reviewing transfer proposals. 267
For some forms of transfers, those administrative processes are not
overly time-consuming; California, for example, exempts some short-
term transfers from key environmental review requirements, greatly
expediting the process. 268 But review of major water rights transfers
can take years. Indeed, the largest water transfer in United States
history, which sends water from California's Imperial Valley to the Los
Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas, took years to negotiate and
has been the subject of ongoing litigation for an additional thirteen
years. 269 Taxation would not involve analogous review of individual
transactions, and thus should offer a more procedurally efficient
mechanism for creating water conservation incentives. 270
For all of these reasons, water transfers cannot bring comprehensive
reform to western water systems.271 They do have their place; where
265 This problem is somewhat analogous to the problems economists have
identified with cap-and-trade systems in which shares are allocated for free, rather
than auctioned. See, e.g., Mankiw, supra note 19, at 18 (describing cap-and-trade
systems without initial auctions as unjustified giveaways). But in the water realm,
there is an additional problem: typically, there is no regulatory cap at all.
266 See Gray, supra note 41 (explaining why water rights are heavily qualified by
broader public interests and needs). Gray's article focuses primarily on California, but, as
others have noted, water nearly everywhere has been treated as a hybrid public/private
resource, in which private claims are not absolute. See United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945) ("Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute
against the world are certainly rare, and water rights are not among them."); THOMPSON
ET AL., supra note 35, at 588 ("[T~he most distinctive legal feature of water is its status as
a public resource that cannot be privatized in the ordinary way.").
267 See W. STATES GOVERNORS' Ass'N & W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, supra note 13, at
22-29 (describing third-party impacts of water transfers); Owen, Overallocation, supra
note 170, at 2 (explaining how the intertwined nature of western water use can make
transfers difficult to complete).
268 See CAL. WATER CODE § 1725 (2016) (exempting temporary transfers from
review under the California Environmental Quality Act).
269 See In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274,
299-305 (Ct. App. 2011) (describing the negotiations and part of the litigation).
270 See Jan Pavel & Leo Vitek, Transaction Costs of Environmental Taxation: The
Administrative Burden, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, supra
note 17, at 273 (summarizing studies that generally find low transaction costs).
271 See Hanak et al., supra note 60, at 35 (making a similar point about California
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willing buyers and sellers share physical access to water, and where
third-party effects can be addressed, transfers can help improve water
use efficiency. But those circumstances are unevenly present; and it is
no happenstance that many transfer proponents believe that not
enough water transfers are occurring. 272 Taxation, by contrast, offers
the possibility of a more comprehensive response.
3. Taxes or Service Charges
Allowing water transfers is not the only traditional way to bring
economic incentives into water management. Instead, the most
obvious alternative to a tax is a close cousin: a service charge for water
use. Most water suppliers already charge users a fee for water delivery,
and these fees can be structured to encourage more efficient water
use. 273 Indeed, the large and growing economic literature on water
pricing focuses primarily on these service charges 274 and some water
suppliers now have decades of experience integrating conservation
incentives into their service charge systems. 275 But taxation offers at
least two significant advantages over this more traditional system.
First, a service charge is likely to ignore the scarcity value of water
and, therefore, is likely to be artificially low. A water supplier can pass
on to its customers the expenses it incurs delivering water, and it can
also structure those charges in a way that discourages low-efficiency,
high-volume use. 276 If the supplier is a private utility or a for-profit
company, it also can charge enough additional money to generate a
profit. But a private supplier generally has neither the incentive nor, in
all likelihood, the ability to charge consumers for water supply costs
that are borne by third parties. 277 The impacts of supplying water upon
in-stream environmental quality, for example, generally are not borne
water allocation).
272 See, e.g., CULP ET AL., supra note 252, at 10-14 (arguing that transfers face excessive
legal impediments); Jelena Jezdimirovic & Ellen Hanak, State Water Market Needs Reform,
PPIC BLOG (Feb. 2, 2016), http//www.ppic.org/main/blog-detail.asp?i=1943.
273 See infra notes 332-34 and accompanying text (discussing progressive block
pricing).
274 For exceptions, see supra note 14 (citing sources).
275 See, e.g., Brydon v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 137-44 (Ct.
App. 1994) (upholding a progressive block pricing system).
276 See Hanemann, supra note 58, at 76 (noting that water prices typically include
these costs).
277 Regulated utilities, for example, can charge only those prices that state
regulators allow, and those regulators generally base their price calculations on the
necessary operating expenses of the utility.
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by the water supplier and, therefore, cannot be passed on to its
consumers. Those impacts instead are just externalities, the cost of
which society as a whole bears.
Second, service charges will apply haphazardly. This problem arises
from a basic institutional reality of water supply: it is handled by an
extraordinary number of entities, most of them local or, at most,
regional in scale.2 78 Unless incentive-based service charges were
compelled by state mandate, it is likely that some of these entities
would adopt such charges and many would not. Of course, if each
local entity draws on its own water source, and some of those water
sources are overtapped while others are not, that kind of localized
decision-making would make some sense. But in much of the United
States, water suppliers share common sources, and water systems have
become increasingly integrated.279 To leave fee-based incentives to
local discretion within a partially integrated supply system would
create puzzling inconsistencies, at the very least. At worst, it would
create a sort of prisoners' dilemma, in which a rational supplier would
be reluctant to adopt pricing schemes that reduce its own water use
for fear that its competitors will simply take whatever it conserves.
Neither of those arguments suggests that local suppliers should not
adopt incentive-based service charges. If a supplier needs to reduce its
water use, those charges are a sensible way of proceeding. But they do
explain why a tax that is adopted at a broader geographic scale, and
that takes into account societal costs as well as the operating costs of
water suppliers, would be a more optimal policy.
4. Revenues and the Double Dividend
The foregoing paragraphs have only considered regulatory
effectiveness when comparing taxes to other tools. But taxes also raise
revenue; indeed, for most taxes, that is their raison d'etre, and
behavioral incentives are just a collateral consequence. The same
might well be true for water taxes. If a tax causes only subtle
adjustments in water use patterns, its greater value might arise from
the uses to which its revenues are put. And even if the tax is highly
effective in modifying water use - which would cause declining and,
278 See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 766-74 (describing the variety of entities
that supply water).
279 See, e.g., Theodore E. Grantham & Joshua H. Viers, 100 Years of California's Water
Rights Systent Patterns, Trends and Uncertainty, 9 ENvTL. RES. LETTERS 084012 (2014),
https//watershed.ucdavis.edu/files/biblio/WaterRightsUCDavis-study.pdf (demonstrating
that most major California waterways are subject to multiple water claims, with aggregate
claims often greatly exceeding flows).
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perhaps, unstable revenues - some money will continue to come in,
and uses of that money should be factored into any comparison
between taxes and alternative regulatory regimes.
One possible use of tax revenues is to reduce the need for other forms
of taxation. Water tax revenues, for example, might be used to reduce
income taxes, thus lessening a disincentive for labor.280 For many
environmental economists, this is a preferred outcome. They argue that
by discouraging socially harmful activities and reducing the need for
taxes with larger distortionary effects, Pigouvian taxation can produce a
"double dividend" for society. 281 Whether that double dividend will
actually occur remains a hotly debated question in the environmental
economics literature, with one recent study calling the research
"controversial and confusing." 282 And the controversy and confusion
include the few studies focusing upon water taxes, with studies reaching
disparate results even when focused on the same economy.283
Nevertheless, the studies suggest that a second dividend is at least
possible, if a tax is carefully designed, and that economic gains might at
least reduce the social cost caused by imposing a new tax.284
Another possible use of tax revenues is to fund water governance
and infrastructure. As many recent studies have noted, the United
States' public water systems are old and deteriorating. 285 That
deterioration creates major water supply problems; cities lose huge
amounts of water to leaks. 286 It also creates public health issues, as the
280 See Kilimani et al., supra note 14, at 75.
281 David Pearce, The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming, 101
EcoN. J. 938, 940 (1991).
282 See William K. Jaeger, The Double Dividend Debate, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH
ON ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, supra note 17, at 211.
283 Compare, e.g., Jan H. van Heerden et al., Integrated Water and Economic
Modelling of the Impacts of Water Market Instruments on the South African Economy, 66
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 105, 114-15 (2008) (concluding that in the long term, water taxes
in South Africa will not produce a double dividend), with Letsoalo et al., supra note
14, at 10 ("We show that there can be a triple dividend of water policy,
simultaneously reducing water scarcity, improving economic growth/reducing
unemployment, and reducing poverty.").
284 Of course, even if the second dividend does not arise, the first dividend -
reducing water scarcity and environmental impacts - might alone justify the tax. See
Letsoala et al., supra note 14, at 8 ("The first of the three dividends is the
environmental dividend reaped.").
285 See America's Neglected Water Systems Face a Reckoning, WHARTON UNIV. PA.
(June 10, 2015), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle/americas-neglected-
water-systems-face-a-reckoning/.
286 David Schaper, As Infrastructure Crumbles, Trillions of Gallons of Water Lost,
NPR (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/29/359875321/as-infrastructure-
1606 [Vol. 50:1559
Water and Taxes
recent debacle in Flint, Michigan illustrates. 287 Upgrading that
infrastructure would require major financial investments, which a
water use tax might help supply. A new influx of funding also could
support many environmental restoration projects, which in turn might
help compensate for the enormous environmental impacts of water
consumption. 288 There are also downsides to revenue earmarking.
According to most economists, it is not the ideal use of tax revenues;
they would prefer sending revenues to general funds or using them to
offset other taxes. 289 And there is a real danger that a water project
fund might be allocated largely as pork. For many decades, that is how
water funding in the United States was often spent.290 Nevertheless,
there is an intuitive logic to using revenues from water consumption
taxes to upgrade water infrastructure or to protect aquatic
environments. That intuitive logic might make a water tax into an
easier political sell, even if it falls short of an economic ideal. 291
Finally, revenues could be recycled back to the public as rebates. 292
Determining the rebate formula could be a thorny challenge; for
example, figuring out whether to return revenues on a per capita basis
or to set aside a larger share for heavy water users like farmers would
probably involve difficult economic and political issues. And, again,
the economic consensus seems to be that this option is inferior to a
simple reduction in other taxes. 293 But there are reasons why some
crumbles-trillions-of-gallons-of-water-lost.
287 Joseph Kane & Robert Puentes, Flint's Water Crisis Highlights Need for
Infrastructure Investment and Innovation, AVENUE (Jan. 13, 2016), http//www.
brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2016/01/13-flint-water-crisis-infrastructure-kane-
puentes.
288 Restoration funds might be used for dam removals or to purchase
environmental flows, to provide two particularly promising examples. See Dave Owen
& Colin Apse, Trading Dams, 48 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1043, 1093 (2015) (discussing the
importance of financial carrots for dam removals); Thompson, Markets for Nature,
supra note 138, at 307-14 (describing "environmental brokerage" accounts).
289 See Claudia Dias Soares, Earmarking Revenues from Environmentally Related
Taxes, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, supra note 17, at 102,
108-09.
290 See generally REISNER, supra note 4, at 306-31 (chronicling decades of pork-
barrel spending on dams and other water projects).
291 See Dias Soares, supra note 289, at 110 ("Earmarking within environmental tax
policy can have a strong image-related effect . .. reducing the political costs of a tax
intervention.").
292 See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 15, at 101-02 (describing the rebate component of
British Columbia's carbon tax).
293 See Dias Sores, supra note 289, at 103 ("Non-earmarking is conventionally
acclaimed to represent sound public finance management.").
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carbon tax schemes have included rebate programs: most importantly,
they buy political support, and, depending on the allocation scheme,
they also can insulate the taxes against charges that they are
particularly harmful to the poor.2 9 4
Lastly, government could do all of these things with the tax revenue.
They are mutually exclusive in the sense that the same dollars cannot
be used for more than one purpose. But some of the tax revenues
could support each goal.
In summary, there are many reasons why taxes could be a promising
addition to systems of water use regulation. Indeed, those reasons are
compelling enough that for some tax proponents, the real question
probably would not be whether taxes should be added into systems of
water use regulation, but instead whether they should completely
displace existing systems. After all, if Pigouvian taxation is indeed the
optimal mode of regulation, then any introduction of alternative
regulatory approaches means costly sacrifices to efficiency and
unnecessary increases in regulatory complexity. 295
The argument here does not go quite that far. The real world has an
uncanny knack for sullying the theoretical elegance of any regulatory
system, and taxation has not been exempt from that general rule.29 6
Other regulatory systems do also have their justifications; among
others, sometimes they can provide greater certainty about ultimate
environmental consequences than a tax.297 And, perhaps most
importantly, people are familiar with those alternative systems. Even if
a heavily tax-based policy might have made more sense initially, there
can be substantial costs as regulators and regulated entities figure out
294 See Hsu, supra note 15, at 101 (noting the heavy emphasis supporters of British
Columbia's carbon tax placed on its rebate program); Katri Kosonen, Regressivity of
Environmental Taxation: Myth or Reality?, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, supra note 17, at 161, 173 (noting that targeted revenue
recycling can eliminate regressive effects).
295 See KEOHANE & OLMSTEAD, supra note 235, at 152 (summarizing traditional
Pigouvian theory, and noting that with a properly-set Pigouvian tax, "[n]o other
government intervention ... is necessary").
296 See Barde & Godard, supra note 232, at 33 (" [D]espite a few success stories ...
implementing consistent environmental tax reforms is often fraught with difficulties
and obstacles."); Schuerhoff et al., supra note 14, at 6-13 (describing the real-world
problems that beset the Dutch groundwater tax).
297 This potential has generated ongoing debate between proponents of cap-and-
trade systems and proponents of carbon taxes. See Hsu, supra note 15, at 104-14
(summarizing the debate, and coming down on the side of taxes).
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how to work with new regulatory approaches, and inevitably there
will be glitches along the way. But even if abandoning prior regulatory
approaches would be too drastic a step, the arguments in favor of
taxation are compelling enough that supplementing, and even partially
displacing, those traditional systems is an experiment worth trying.
D. Justice and Water Taxation
In 2014, Maryland's gubernatorial race turned in large part on
something derided as a "rain tax." 298 In reality, the tax raised money to
address the very real water quality problems associated with
stormwater runoff, and landowners' payments would have been scaled
in proportion to their contributions to the underlying problem.299 The
tax, in other words, served widely supported policy goals, and its
architects had tried to be fair. But the outraged political reaction
illustrates the presence of a widespread, if somewhat inchoate, sense
that water just isn't the sort of thing that ought to be taxed. At times,
that sense seems to cut across political lines. Whether the activists are
conservatives who view water use charges as attacks on their way of
life or liberals who decry private commodification of water, there is a
shared sense that water is our birthright and entitlement, not
something anyone should use economic instruments to discourage us
from using. With the United Nations and some countries now treating
water access as a fundamental human right, that sense of entitlement
might seem particularly compelling.300
Those beliefs might undercut all the arguments raised thus far. If,
regardless of any economic argument in its favor, there is something
fundamentally unjust about taxing water, then any other argument in
favor of water taxation will be a nonstarter. This section, therefore,
confronts that basic question: are there compelling reasons, economics
and practicalities aside, why taxing water is something government
just should not do?
298 See Jenna Johnson, Maryland Senate Unanimously Approves Easing 'Rain Tax'
Terms, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/46783bb2-
cfl6-1 1e4-8a46-bldc9be5a8ff-story.html.
299 See Jon Green, Martin O'Malley's "Rain Tax" Is Actually a Great Idea,
AMERICABLOG (Sept. 9, 2015, 1:46 PM), http://americablog.com/2015/09/martin-
omalleys-rain-tax-is-actually-a-great-idea.html.
300 See generally David Takacs, South Africa and the Human Right to Water: Equity,
Ecology, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 34 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 55, 63 (2016) (describing
the United Nations' endorsement of a human right to water).
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1. The "Everyday Libertarian"30 1 Critique of Water Taxation
Maryland is an eastern state, and thus a place where precipitation
seems like a predictable inconvenience, not a thing to be taxed. But to
someone steeped in the libertarian mythology of the American West,
visceral opposition to water taxes might seem even more intuitive.
Central to the western self-image is the strong, independent man who
turns nature to societal benefit through the sweat of his own physical
labor. That self-image intertwines rather nicely with the creation
myths of western water law, for the creators of prior appropriation
doctrine were gold miners, men who thumbed their noses at both
federal ownership of the lands they used and traditional eastern water
law doctrines that would have restrained their fortune-seeking.302 The
benefit of nature's conquest, at least in traditional western ideology,
also was clear; turning deserts into agricultural fields was
"reclamation," a word infused with manifest destiny and biblical
overtones.303 Taking water out of streams, therefore, was not self-
interested behavior; it was, instead, the heroic correction of a
"perversity of nature." 304 None of these views is unique to water. Anti-
tax arguments are often grounded in a libertarian worldview, in which
a pre-tax economic ordering is presumptively moral and just, and in
which any argument for reallocating resources must meet a high
burden of persuasion. 305 But in the water realm, with its particularly
close identity with western ideals of independence and individualism,
everyday libertarianism might seem to hold especially powerful sway.
But tax libertarianism, as its many critics have noted, rests on a core
fallacy.306 Wealth and social stability depend upon governance. 307 As
flawed as governance can be, anarchy is usually much worse. And
governance generally requires taxes; they are, as Justice Oliver
301 This term comes from MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 78, at 65. Murphy and
Nagel use it to describe a widespread view - perhaps best illustrated by economists'
repeated discussion of the "distortions" that taxation imposes - that taxation is an
intrusion upon a naturally functioning, tax-free market ordering. See id. at 36, 65.
302 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 232 (1992).
303 See Brief History: Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. BUREAU RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/history/2011NEWBRIEFHISTORY.pdf (last visited July 13, 2016)
("The concept was that irrigation would 'reclaim' or 'subjugate' western arid lands for
human use.").
304 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 728 (1950).
305 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 78, at 15.
306 See, e.g., id. at 32-33.
307 See id.
1610 [Vol. 50:1559
Water and Taxes
Wendell Holmes once put it, "what we pay for civilized society." 308
This has been particularly true for water. Most people, even in the
West, get their water through government agencies, and often through
sequences of agencies. 309 Those agencies, in turn, often operate water
projects built and operated at public expense. 310 Conversely farmers
who attempted to proceed without government assistance often failed.
Floods overwhelmed their irrigation works, or their groundwater wells
ran dry when they and their neighbors pumped more water than
natural recharge could replace.311 Their struggles reflected basic water
project economics. The up-front capital costs of water infrastructure
are generally so high, and payback periods so long, that private
projects cannot pencil out.312
Government also brings value to water rights by regulating them.
This proposition may not seem obvious, and to many water users, it
may even seem bizarre. Government regulation, in their view, is just
an onerous intrusion, and the idea that water users might have to pay
to be regulated would seem like asking a victim to pay compensation
for his own injuries.3 13 But that proposition is not absurd at all. Water
is a classic commons; it is a shared resource that competing users will
often exploit to self-destructive excess unless they are bound by some
mutual constraint.3 14 Without governance, water rights, therefore, are
likely to hold little value, for they would be unprotected against
interference by other competing users.3 15 Long-term investments in
308 IRS, supra note 75.
309 See Thompson, Institutional Perspectives, supra note 49, at 686-89.
310 See WILKINSON, supra note 302, at 231 (noting the importance of federal
subsidies to western water development); see also HUNDLEY, supra note 57, at xix
(same). For the classic critique of federal water project development, see REISNER,
supra note 4.
311 See, e.g., HUNDLEY, supra note 57, at 88-119, 203-302 (describing the struggles
that led to California to transition away from an era of small-scale, private water
development).
312 See Hanemann, supra note 58, at 74-76.
313 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Bragg, Takings, and the Economics of Limited Resources,
ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (Aug. 29, 2013), http//lawprofessors.typepad.com/
environmentallaw/2013/08/bragg-takings-and-the-economics-of-limited-resources.htm
(critiquing Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W. 3d 118 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013), a
recent Texas case in which the trial and appellate courts assumed that, in the absence of
regulation, users of an overtapped aquifer would simply be able to take as much water as
they wanted).
314 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 82-88, 103-39 (1990) (using water management case studies
to explore challenges (and successes) of common-access resource management).
315 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
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water infrastructure would make little sense, for the assets could be
left stranded when supplies disappear. And water rights would be
difficult to trade, for the purchasing party would have no guarantees
that the conveyed rights meant anything. The end result of non-
regulation would likely be a conflict-ridden system in which each user
strives to obtain as much as possible as quickly as possible, but in
which the prospects for long-term stability (and environmental
protection of aquatic resources) are slim. 316 Regulatory interventions
to prevent that state of nature, therefore, provide powerful collective
benefits, and those regulatory interventions must be funded somehow.
Taxes on other activities have been the traditional source of that
funding, but a tax on water use would better align the burdens of
taxation with the governance benefits that taxation allows.
Beyond these reasons, traditional water law doctrines support the
idea that water use is an appropriate target for taxation. Across the
United States, water is subject to a dual ownership regime. Private
users can and do obtain property rights to use water.317 But ownership
of the water itself remains with the state, which holds that water in
trust for its citizens.318 The implications of this dual ownership system
are not always entirely clear, and they vary from state to state.319 But
the system nevertheless reflects a widespread view that water is a
public resource that never entirely sheds its public character. 320 Users
pay to access many other public natural resources; they pay fees to
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 249-53 (2000) (describing this dynamic with
groundwater use).
316 See id.
317 See Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) ("[T]he right of property in water
is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its
use.").
318 See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (2016) ("All water within the State is the
property of the people of the state."); NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2016) ("The water of
all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the State whether above or
beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public.").
319 For discussion of various versions of the public trust doctrine - which is just
one of the doctrines that qualifies water rights - see Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private
Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53
(2010), and Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrine: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007).
320 See Joseph Sax, Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai'i's Public
Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAw. L. REV. 21, 24 (2001) ("All these diverse laws from widely
separated places on the globe emphasize one idea: Water is first and foremost a public
community resource. . . .").
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harvest timber, for example, and royalties to extract oil and natural
gas. 321 Obtaining water without charge, therefore, is somewhat
anomalous. 322 And paying taxes on water would just partly
compensate the public for allowing a shared resource to be redirected
to private use.
That argument comes with a caveat: private ownership of water
rights should still mean something.323 Landowners are not asked to
make an annual payment of the full scarcity value of their land; while
that ownership may be taxed and regulated, ownership does confer
some degree of economic privilege against government revenue-
seeking and control.324 If property rights in water are to be
meaningful, then some protection against governmental fundraising
must also exist; requiring water right holders to pay the full scarcity
value of their water rights would be akin to requiring them to
purchase those rights anew each successive year.325 But that caveat
only suggests that water taxation rates should be moderate, not that
water taxation should not exist at all.
Perhaps there are human activities, or forms of wealth, that simply
do not belong in the tax system. They may be too closely tied to
personal labor or personal identity for society to claim a share.326 Or,
alternatively, the activities may provide such important social benefits
that government would never want to dissuade them through taxation.
But water use is not one of those activities.
321 See WILKINSON, supra note 302, at 242.
322 See id. at 241-42 ("This is nearly unique in public resource law and policy.").
323 That caveat would not apply, however, to a country that does not treat water
use as a matter of property law.
324 See, e.g., Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (allowing
regulation of property, but holding that regulations that go "too far" are takings).
325 Of course, if inherent limitations in a water right - like its subsidiarity to
public interests embodied in state public trust doctrines or the federal navigational
servitude - could lawfully result in the elimination of water use under that right,
then there is no great injustice in allowing the state to tax water consumption under
that right quite heavily. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
507-10 (1945) (holding that private water rights are subservient to the "dominant
public interest in navigation"); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, of Alpine Cty.,
658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (stating that the public trust doctrine "bars [the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power] or any other party from claiming a vested
right to divert waters once it becomes clear that such diversions harm the interests
protected by the public trust.").
326 See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv.
957 (1982) (arguing that some forms of property deserve special treatment because of
their close connections to individual identity).
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2. Commodifying the Sacred and Hurting the Poor?
A very different critique of water taxation is likely to arise from
those on the political left. In recent years, there has been no shortage
of critiques of any effort at commodifying water.327 Those critiques are
based partly on the direct consequences of water pricing for poor
people and partly on a more general sense that pricing water
undercuts its status as a community resource with almost sacred
importance to human life.3 28 Often these critiques are thoroughly
intertwined with debates over the privatization of water deliveries, and
thus target private corporations rather than public taxation.329 But
some of the rhetoric is often broad enough to sweep in any attempt to
treat water as a commodity with a price.330
The former critique is a potentially powerful one, for water taxes
could hit poor people especially hard. To meet basic human needs,
everyone needs some water. And while rich people typically use much
more water than poor people, largely because their lots and houses
tend to be bigger, poor people often pay a much larger percentage of
their income for water.331 To pile an additional water charge onto poor
people's pre-existing economic burdens, therefore, might seem rather
unwise and unfair.
This is an important problem, but it is not a new one, and
economists and policymakers studying water pricing have identified a
straightforward fix. Water suppliers can deliver a basic allocation of
water - a block, in water pricing parlance - for a very low rate, or
even for free, and then can charge increasing rates for each additional
increment of water use.332 Progressive block pricing, as this scheme is
327 See, e.g., VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT X
(2002) ("The culture of commodification is at war with diverse cultures of sharing, of
giving and receiving water as a free gift.").
328 E.g., Maude Barlow & Tony Clarke, Who Owns Water?, NATION (Aug. 15,
2002), https://www.thenation.com/article/who-owns-water/.
329 See, e.g., SHIVA, supra note 327, at x (describing water wars as pitting people and
species against large corporations); William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, NEW YORKER
(Apr. 8, 2002), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/04/08/leasing-the-rain
(describing conflicts over water privatization in Cochabamba, Bolivia).
330 E.g., Barlow & Clarke, supra note 328 ("[C]itizens must establish clear
perimeters around those areas that are sacred to life and necessary for the survival of
the planet. Simply, governments must declare that water belongs to the earth and all
species and is a fundamental human right. No one has the right to appropriate it for
profit.").
331 Outside the United States' borders, this problem is even more pronounced. See
WATERAID, WATER: AT WHAT COST? THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S WATER 2016 (2016).
332 See Charles W. Howe, The Functions, Impacts and Effectiveness of Water Pricing:
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known, is already used for some utility fee structures, and there is no
legal or economic reason why it could not also be used for taxes. 333
Indeed, in some states, like California, where constitutional
restrictions on fees could limit suppliers' ability to use progressive
block pricing, the tax code might offer an easier (legally, if not
politically) way to implement a progressive pricing scheme, and thus
to reduce the regressive effects of water pricing.334
An alternative version of this argument focuses on the likely effects
on farmers and food production. Imposing taxes on water would raise
the economic cost of water-intensive activities, and no activity
consumes more water than agriculture. 335 If the tax revenues simply
remit to the general fund, or go to support water use regulation, the
aggregate effect of a water tax would be to transfer wealth from
agricultural communities to the rest of society.336 And if the tax tips
marginally economic agricultural activities to a point of non-viability,
it could eliminate those activities, with ripple effects throughout the
communities where the eliminated activities once occurred.337 Many
rural areas already are struggling economically, and the strain of a
water tax would be an unwelcome additional blow. 338
Evidence from the United States and Canada, 21 WATER RESOURCES DEv. 43, 45 (2005)
(discussing "life line pricing").
333 See id. at 47-48 (discussing various pricing structures, and also observing that
some utilities still use declining block pricing, which offers lower per-volume rates to
higher users).
334 See Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr.
3d 362, 380-81 (Ct. App. 2015) (invalidating a progressive block pricing scheme);
City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 380-81 (Ct. App.
2011) (same).
335 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 7.
336 This effect would not occur if farmers can pass increased production costs on to
consumers. But in a global market, where consumers can readily seek food from
alternative sources, producers are not likely to be able to pass on their costs. See
generally SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 16, at 76-77 (noting that producers generally
cannot shift tax costs onto consumers when those consumers have alternative
suppliers).
337 Similar concerns often arise with water transfers. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Weber,
Effects of Water Transfers on Rural Areas: A Response to Shupe, Weatherford, and
Checchio, 30 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 13, 13-15 (1990).
338 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE 2-5 (2014) (describing
stagnant job growth, higher poverty rates, declining population, and lagging education
levels). The impacts would not be equally felt across agricultural sectors, however. If
the tax focuses on water diversions, rather than use of natural rainfall, agricultural
producers in humid areas would benefit from a new competitive advantage (or, from
their perspective, the reduction in their former competitive disadvantage). See
Berrittella et al., supra note 14, at 1804-06 (finding that scarcity charges or restrictions
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That is a harsh consequence, but it also is difficult to divorce it from
the benefits of water taxation. If the whole purpose of a Pigouvian tax
is to internalize externalities and thus correct flaws in the market, then
the decline of activities that depended upon those flaws for their
viability is a sign that the tax is working.339 To put it in more practical
terms, if a water tax reduces the production of alfalfa and raises the
price of beef, that may be evidence that the pricing system is helping
people realize, and account for, the real economic cost of beef.340
Additionally, there are many other legal doctrines, from the public
trust doctrine to the Endangered Species Act, to which regulators or
activists might also turn to compel shifts in water use.341 Reallocations
through the comparatively gentle tax system may be preferable to
these other regulatory alternatives.
Taxes also can be structured to mitigate those impacts. If a goal is to
reduce water use without transferring money away from the agricultural
sector, revenue from the tax could be remitted to farmers.342 The
incentive to conserve water still would exist, for a farmer could obtain
the best balance of tax and remittance payments by keeping her water
use as low as possible. But if the aggregate payments to farmers are tied
to the aggregate taxes they pay, the net loss to agricultural communities
would only be the transaction costs of collecting the taxes and
delivering remittances.343 The remittance also need not be complete; a
partial remittance scheme might balance fairness to non-agricultural
users with the need to soften agriculture's blows.
That leaves the argument that placing a price on water will
somehow undermine the sacred, and that argument is not so
will benefit agricultural producers in areas with abundant water).
339 See CULP ET AL., supra note 252, at 10-19 (repeatedly citing low-value uses by
agriculture as the primary evidence of the need for better price incentives for water).
3+ See Herrero et al., supra note 186, at 20888 (discussing the massive
environmental impact of livestock production); see also Berrittella et al., supra note 14,
at 1809 (finding that water taxes could benefit the overall United States economy by
correcting for excessive subsidization of agriculture and shifting resources into more
productive endeavors).
341 See Owen, Environmental Dynamism, supra note 11, at 1184-86.
342 See, e.g., Yigit Saglam, Supply-Based Dynamic Ramsey Pricing: Avoiding Water
Shortages, 51 WATER RES. RESEARCH 669, 669-72 (2015) (modeling a somewhat similar
scenario, and finding that it avoids shortages and produces welfare benefits). This idea
is analogous to tax-and-dividend approaches for greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g.,
Evan Lehmann, A 'Believer' Takes over Conservative Carbon Tax Effort, CLIMATEWIRE
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060017471 (describing work by the
R Street Institute, a conservative think tank, to support a revenue-neutral carbon tax).
343 By creating an incentive for greater efficiency, the scheme might actually
increase the welfare of the agricultural sector. See Saglam, supra note 342, at 683.
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compelling. Initially, the implications of that argument, even if it is
correct, are far from clear; people who assert with great vehemence
that water is a community resource, not just a commodity, often
employ that rhetoric in support of diametrically opposing ends. 344
Additionally, that argument has always been somewhat fanciful, for
societies have often treated water partly as a community resource and
partly as an economic commodity. 345 Putting a price on water,
therefore, is not new, and what would be new is making the price
sensible. A price that incorporates the value of water to society as a
whole, not just to the consumer who receives it or the supplier who
delivers it, would be a dramatic step toward incorporating community
values into water allocation. And while the cold hand of economics
may not seem like a particularly sacred way to promote those values, it
does often work.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, few legal areas are as complicated as water law.
The field draws heavily upon property, administrative, and
environmental law while adding in many of its own doctrinal
principles. But in all of this complexity, taxes have never played a
prominent role. That has been an unfortunate oversight. As this article
has shown, there are numerous intersections between the tax code and
water policy, and while the resulting incentives probably are of no
more than minor importance, they do offer promising targets for
reform. More importantly, direct taxation of water consumption could
be an effective method of water policy reform.
344 Compare Freyfogle, Common Wealth, supra note 56, at 45 (asserting that
understanding water as a community resource will lead to greater environmental
protection and less entrenchment of traditional agricultural uses), with Weber, supra
note 337, at 13-15 (raising community interests in water as reasons why water should
not be transferred).
345 See James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 94, 99-113 (2006) (finding this dual treatment of water in Islamic, Hebrew,
Roman, and American custom and law).
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